Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-063 *3 April 1995*

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Berisha Views Prospects For Economic Growth

MS0304090595 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 3 Apr 95 p 25

[Report by James Hansen, incorporating remarks by Albanian President Sali Berisha: "Flat On Its Back But Looking At The Stars"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Albania can become Europe's Taiwan. That is the unlikely ambition of Albania's president, Sali Berisha. According to Dr Berisha: "Albania today is much like Taiwan 35 years ago. Our most important goal is to place our country in a fast development model based on the growth of small businesses, just like they did."

When the Albanian president speaks of small business, he means it: kiosks selling foreign cigarettes, sandwiches and soft drinks that carpet the country's towns are the cutting edge of the Albanian economy. "These kiosks," he says, "teach capitalism, distribute revenues and create jobs." A Western visitor to Tirana, the capital, is more sceptical, pointing out that there are "more hamburger stands than dogs".

The president is a cardiologist by profession, elected as the first democratically-appointed leader to perform a bypass operation on the viciously xenophobic Communist regime that ruled for 45 years. He is learning on the job.

Fast growth for Albania is not only desirable, it is essential to Mr Berisha's prospects of staying in employment, despite a lack of obvious flair for his new career. Albania is by far the poorest country in Europe. The World Bank estimates per capita income at under 190 pounds a year.

Wage scales match the macro-economic data. In Tirana, trained secretaries and telephone operators earn about 26 pounds a month; in the health service, Dr Berisha's colleagues would earn about twice that. They are the lucky ones, because they have a job. Reliable data are hard to come by in this largely rural country, where many work for food rather than cash, but some Western relief organisations believe the unemployment rate may be as high as 40pc.

This misery is strategically troublesome because the Albanian population is 10pc European and 90pc Moslem and just 39 nautical miles from Italy across the lower Adriatic Sea.

Western capitals would like to believe someone knows what he is doing in Tirana but Dr Berisha is hardly reassuring when he replies to a question about why Albania chose to peg its currency, the lek, to the dollar rather than to the German mark, as have most other Balkan countries. "That just happened," he said. The Central Bank had nothing to do with it."

For what it is worth, Dr Berisha says he estimates his country's kiosk-based economy will grow by "well over 7.5pc this year". If his forecast is correct, Albanians selling cigarettes to one another will fuel the fastest economic growth in Europe.

Animal banking

Finance, you might think, pretty much presumes the existence of money. So how do you develop a credit system to finance agricultural production among a population that has very nearly no money at all?

That's the puzzle facing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), a tiny but unusually efficient United Nations relief agency, which has drawn the unenviable task of bringing prosperity to Albania's miserable north-eastern quarter.

According to the Albanian Ministry of Agriculture, which is responsible for rural development average per capita income in the districts of Puke, Peshkopia, Kukes, Has and Tropoje is somewhere between 60 pounds and 100 pounds a year.

IFAD has hit on the plan of introducing what it calls "animal banking" to the area. In synthesis, a project now being studied by the agency calls for the creation of a rural 'bank' that will lend pregnant cattle to moneyless peasants—taking interest in the form of calves.

IFAD project personnel say they have used the system with success in southern Sudan but are not yet certain it will work in Albania, where conditions are "if anything, worse," according to one aid worker. One doubter is Zana Konini, an officer of the rural development fund. "There is a high likelihood," she says, "that the farmers will feed only the calves they can keep, and leave those they must return at the edge of starvation."

Western investment

Given the state of affairs in today's Albania, it is hardly surprising that direct foreign investment lags. The World Bank thinks that the country's poverty and highly-uncertain business climate do not make it an attractive risk.

The government claims direct foreign investment of anything from $80m to $200m in 1994, but details are difficult to pin down. The sum, whatever it is, seems to include the exploration fees that multi-national oil companies are paying for the chance to see whether there are any interesting hydrocarbons beneath Albania or under the waters around it. The word in Tirana is that Mobil is the latest company to seek oil and gas exploration rights. If negotiations succeed, it will join Royal Dutch/Shell, which recently signed an exploration agreement worth a reported $14m for two onshore blocks of 800 and 760 square kilometres.

As for the more usual kind of direct investment, the American Embassy in Tirana cites the case of Ekrem Bardha as being representative. Mr Bardha fled Albania in 1953 and went to the United States, where he became

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a millionaire. Today, he operates 11 McDonald's restaurant franchises in and around the grimy industrial city of Detroit. When Albania's Communist regime completed its implosion in 1991, Mr Bardha came back to take a look at the old country and decided to invest one of his millions in opening Tirana's glitziest restaurant.

A full-blown meal with wine at La Piazza—the cooking is Italian rather than Big Mac—costs between 12 and 13 pounds. Moderate by Western standards, but half the monthly wage of a Tirana secretary. Fatos Pipa, the restaurant's manager, advises booking in advance to guarantee a table. He says about half his clients are foreigners and that the other 50pc belong to "Albania's new bourgeoisie". They are a piratical looking lot, but then, capitalism can be a rum business.

Tirana Court 'Leaders' Resign in Protest

AU0104200395 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Relations between the Justice Ministry and the Tirana District Court have reached a critical phase. As a protest against the head of the justice ministry, three main leaders of this court yesterday resigned in order to work as ordinary judges. They oppose a recent decision by Justice Minister Frasheri to dismiss two judges and appoint some others, as well as some other decisions that they say infringe the sovereignty of the court.

Observers connect the aggravation of this conflict with the completion of a broad inquiry by the justice ministry into the Tirana Court, in which officials say serious violations in judicial processes were discovered.

In a public announcement, a spokesman for the justice ministry, meanwhile, has stressed that the resignation of three of the Tirana Court leaders is hasty, essentially unwarranted, and not based on law. The problems referred to in the resignation statement are groundless. The justice ministry's actions are in full conformity with the main constitutional provisions and the law on the organization of justice. [passage omitted]

Proceeding from these judicial prerogatives and concerns that have arisen owing to the dragging out of trials, various violations of procedures, and other violations of an administrative nature, the justice ministry is to continue its inquiries into all the district courts and the court of appeals.

The justice ministry has in no case violated the independence of the judiciary in finding a concrete solution to judicial issues. In the future, the justice ministry will continue to carry out inquiries into the courts and will demand, in any case and in conformity with the law, that judges and other employees of the judicial administration be held to account, convinced that this serves the establishment of justice and the independence of the judiciary to fulfill the citizens' demands fairly, the announcement by the justice ministry spokesman concludes.

TU Leader on Politicization of Economic Issues

AU0304103495 Tirana SINDIKALISTI in Albanian 19 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Valer Xheka, president of the Union of Independent Albanian Trade Unions, by unnamed SINDIKALISTI correspondent; place and date not given: "Government Thought About Issues Too Late, Consequences of This Delay Fall on it...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Though the public is now aware of the outcome of the Berat textile workers' strike, we interviewed Mr. Valer Xheka, president of the BSPSH [Union of Independent Albanian Trade Unions:

[SINDIKALISTI] Mr. Xheka, what is your opinion about the outcome of the Berat workers' strike. How did you take the government's move?

[Xheka] In spite of the fact that the BSPSH took a clear and resolute stand in support of the Berat workers, in the final analysis it was the right of the workers themselves to decide the fate of their initiative. We supported and will always support the just demands of our workers, but at the same time we are of the opinion that such serious conflicts must be avoided as much as possible—not by neglecting the people's demands of course, but through dialogue and the reciprocal awareness of the need to solve the problems. The strike was called off because the government agreed to meet the workers' demands. However, why precisely now should events precipitate to a hunger strike, leaving the door open for such vital and purely economic demands of the people to be politicized? These are questions that unfortunately the government officials are not asking themselves, they are always late in thinking about them, and it is not difficult to imagine the consequences. In spite of the way in which government representatives have acted in the past or may act in the future, the BSPSH will resolutely represent the interests of the workers, always taking prudent, objective and constructive steps so as not to exaggerate the real concerns of the people. It is not our fault if the government is not aware of this. We are convinced that the volatile, often heated, political situation in Albania, of which the government is often a slave, has nothing to do with our trade unions. Whoever tries to politicize the trade union movement and make it an instrument for their own interests, will sound unconvincing.

Foreign Minister's Hedging on Answer Criticized

AU0304102395 Tirana ALTERNATIVA SD in Albanian 21 Mar 95 p 2

[Commentary by Thimi Nika: "Mr. Serreqi Gives a 'Diplomatic' Answer"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Second on the line, after the minister of education, in the marathon of ministerial news conference, "on the occasion of the third anniversary of the victory of democracy," Foreign Affairs Minister Serreqi, last Saturday, faced with journalists of various newspapers and media. Putting the emphasis on the foreign policy achievements, he considered the news conference as his "obligation to face the broad public."

Without going into the details of the news conference, which have already been made known to the public, I would like to deal here with the question that I asked him, in my capacity as ALTERNATIVA SD journalist, and the answer the minister of foreign affairs gave me.

The question was a straightforward one, whereas the answer was indirect, even extremely partial.

The question: "Certain German personalities and others, who have come to Albania and have even spoken to our parliament, have determined that Kosovo should have autonomous status. How do you take it? Do you support these statements, or not, and what arguments do you have to support your response? Further: What is the strategy of the ministry of foreign affairs on Albania's integration into Europe? Shall we join Europe as a unified or as a partitioned nation and state? How much does our foreign affairs ministry's strategy agree with that of the government of Kosovo?

In essence, Mr. Serreqi's "laconic" answer was: "Our national question has been and remains the main priority, constituting the backbone of the Albanian state's foreign policy. After this, he stated that "the threat of spreading the conflict over Kosovo is a real danger. The degree of Serb repression is growing; therefore Albania has reiterated its request for the return of the OSCE observers to Kosovo, and finding an acceptable solution through dialogue between the legitimate representatives of the Albanian population and Belgrade in the presence of a third party."

As can be seen, the question and the answer do not correspond. Outside the question, Serreqi's words sound perfect. You cannot even move a semicolon. However, if you link the answer to the question, it is not difficult to realize that they are too far apart from each other!

It seems that Mr. Serreqi preferred to give not a straightforward but a diplomatic answer. He did not mention at all the declarations made by various foreign dignitaries who from the rostrum of our parliament had stated that the Albanian population in Kosovo is a minority and is therefore entitled to nothing more than autonomy. Is Mr. Serreqi for or against these declarations? Of course, he is not of the same opinion as them. Then why did he keep silent when these statements were made? Why did he sidestep this question in his news conference? "That is politics," someone could say. However, to put Albanian policy in an inferior position is an ostrich-like act.

Further, Mr. Serreqi was asked to speak about the concrete strategy of his ministry and of Albanian diplomacy on the national question. To say only that "the national question has been and remains the priority of Albanian foreign policy," does not necessarily mean that you answered the question. The question was concrete and implied: Will the injustice history has done to the Albanians be redressed, and if so, when?

Minister Serreqi sidestepped this question too, by using, for safety's sake, the already too well-known formula dictated by international factors according to which "we are against violent border changes." No, Mr. Serreqi, the question did not ask for such a thing, either. It has never come to my mind, as the author of that question, that we could change the borders by force. What I wanted to hear from you was the optimum (I am using President Berisha's word) that we had to deal with in this matter. I got the impression that you understood my question quite well, whereas your answer reminded me what a member of the Kosovo government once said to me: "Our government is a government of outstretched hands," (meaning: we are knocking at the doors of Europe), and we do not dare to come up openly with the thesis of Albanians' joining Europe as a unified nation, with their unified state."

Are we perhaps dealing here with a lack of clear strategy on our national question? What about the government of Kosovo? Has it worked out an adequate strategy of its own on this issue? These questions cannot help reminding us of the London Conference of 1992, in which the Albanians were represented by more than one delegation and without having a well-crystallized thought of their own.... How long will we continue to act like this?!

Concluding these lines, I would like to clarify a fact: It was not my annoyance that obliged me to make public this question and the answer it received in the news conference. On the contrary, it is the particular importance of the problem and all the Albanian interest it represents that makes me ask Mr. Serreqi once again to declare himself in public by concrete writing on the pages of ALTERNATIVA SD. I hope his pronouncement will not be lacking.

Commentary: Berisha Policy on Kosovo 'Rudderless'

AU0304113195 Tirana KOMBI in Albanian 24 Mar 95 pp 1, 8

[Commentary by Mahmut Bakalli: "The Nation Does Not Demand the Internationalization of the Kosovar Problem, but its Total Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Berisha's news conference of 22 March 1995 could be described as a "river" conference. For more than an hour and a half (the longest news conference ever by the head of state), the words on the PD's (Democratic Party) successes during its three years in office flowed along like a river. These successes, according to Berisha, could be compared to successes achieved in 300 years!

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We are not going to deal with the main topic of this conference, which occupies almost two pages of the 22 March RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE. We will treat only the national question. To this vital problem of the Albanian people, the present Albanian president dedicated only a minute and a half.

Here is what he said on the matter: "Another central objective of our foreign policy has been the internationalization of the Kosovar problem. If we compare the prominence given to the Kosovar problem three years ago with the present time, I can say that today's is more.... Albania has made and is still making its indisputable contribution to the internationalization and treatment of this problem."

In essence, he said nothing, or he said what others, the great powers and followers of Milosevic's policy, had already said about Kosova.

The Albanian president has once again sacrificed the Kosovar problem and the Albanian national question to European strategic interests in the Balkans.

For the sake of European stability, the Albanian nation, according to Berisha, is destined to remain dismembered for ever. According to him, the people of Kosova and other Albanians living in their territories in former Yugoslavia must be sacrificed so as not to annoy the great powers. According to our president, the Albanians in Kosova, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM], and Montenegro must eternally submit to bloody Greater Serbian violence. According to him, they must continue to live in slavery because this is the wish of certain governments that have traditionally behaved unfaithfully toward the Albanian nation.

Berisha, from being a "lion," has ended up as a lamb in the face of European and U.S. politicians. From being an "eagle," Berisha is reduced to being a scared chicken before the anti-Albanian U.S., British, French, and German options, let alone the Russo-Serbian claims.

What kind of a solution does Mr. Berisha expect from the recommended Serb-Kosovar dialogue, other than the Kosovar people's submission to chauvinistic Greater Serbian desires?

The three years of Berisha's rule have plunged the solution of the all-Albanian question into chaos because of his rudderless, confused, narrow-minded, and amateurish policy, which is totally lacking in any skillful tactics.

The Albanian nation will never forgive Berisha, his Democratic Party, or his staff, who actually guide Albanian policy, for sacrificing all-Albanian interests. It will never forgive Berisha's tenacious opposition to the appeal of the Albanian Pan-National Assembly. Berisha will never be forgiven for boycotting the efforts of Albanian patriots to create a unified platform for the solution of the great national question and the realization of the centuries-long aspiration for the unification of all Albanians into one single national state.

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Zhelev on South Korean Visit, Videnov Statement

AU0204162895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0400 GMT 2 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A Bulgarian delegation led by President Zhelyu Zhelev departed on an official visit to South Korea yesterday evening. This is how President Zhelev described his expectations of the visit:

[Begin Zhelev recording] We are departing with much hope. However, the visit itself will determine what really happens.

South Korea is a country that enjoys an incredible prosperity. It is one of the few countries that dispose of free capitals and that are in the midst of an expansion process throughout the world, including East Europe. In Romania and Bulgaria, at least for the time being, several Korean companies are only selling cars. We hope to modify this situation. There have been talks about a South Korean credit of approximately $50 million. I do not know what precise form the credit will have, but it is attached to exceptionally favorable conditions. The talks there will determine everything. [end recording]

Asked by our correspondent Silviya Velikova to comment on the statement that Prime Minister Zhan Videnov made to Bulgarian television to the effect that everything in the country will normalize within 20 months—having in mind the exacerbated relations between the president, the parliamentary majority, and the cabinet—President Zhelev answered: Many things could happen within 20 months. There could be other governments and other majorities.

Zhelev Meets With Russian Ambassador 31 March

AU3103200395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 31 March President Zhelyu Zhelev met Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev. After the meeting, which lasted 45 minutes, Ambassador Avdeyev said that its purpose has been to maintain the regular dialogue of Russian-Bulgarian relations.

In addition to the development of bilateral relations, President Zhelev and Ambassador Avdeyev also discussed the development of international relations and the Russian assessment of U.S.-Russian relations.

Ambassador Avdeyev and President Zhelev also discussed the upcoming celebrations in Moscow of the 50th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite-Fascist Germany. President Zhelev has again confirmed his willingness to take part in the celebrations.

After the meeting Ambassador Avdeyev said that Prime Minister Zhan Videnov has also officially confirmed that he will be in Moscow on 9 May.

Zhelev, Papoulias Discuss 'Important Issues'

AU3103172395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 31 March President Zhelyu Zhelev met with Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias. All important issues of bilateral interest—such as relations between the two peoples, opening new border checkpoints, and visa alleviations for the citizens—have been discussed.

Minister Papoulias has conveyed to Dr. Zhelev the invitation of Greek President Konstandinos Stefanopoulos to visit Greece. For his part, President Zhelev has addressed an analogous invitation to his Greek counterpart to visit Bulgaria.

Papoulias Concludes Visit

NC3103201795 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 1800 GMT 31 Mar 95

[Report by Sofia special correspondent Mirella Kalostipi—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Greek-Bulgarian trade exchanges now reach the total worth of $500 million, an amount that according to the assessment of both sides could double very soon, since bilateral relations, as Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias said, are characterized by a dynamic and upward trend.

Mr. Papoulias concluded his official visit in Sofia by giving a joint news conference with his Bulgarian counterpart Georgi Pirinski. Mr. Papoulias stressed that the Bulgarian side—government and opposition—officially confirmed its will to develop relations with Greece, since its approach with the European structures, including security, is of primary importance to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian foreign minister described his Greek counterpart's visit to Bulgaria as successful because, as he put it, from now on the two countries open a new chapter of continuous and systematic contact at a political level.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov has already accepted an invitation by Andreas Papandreou to pay an official visit to Athens in early summer, while Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev also accepted a corresponding invitation by Greek President Konstandinos Stefanopoulos.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Videnov talked about excellent Greek-Bulgarian relations, after his meeting with Mr. Papoulias. Mr. Videnov said decisive steps will be taken soon to facilitate business activities by settling the matter of passport visas. The matter of Bulgarian seasonal workers will also be settled in accordance with a plan conveyed by Mr. Papoulias.

The construction of a pipeline to carry Russian oil to Alexandroupolis via Bulgaria and the inflow of the (?Nestos) river water into Greece will be discussed furtherm and are expected to conclude in the form of an agreement in a few months or a year.

At the same time, a Greek-Bulgarian identity of views was established as regards the crisis in former Yugoslavia, as a result also of the damage that both countries suffer due to the economic embargo.

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Caution Advised During Summit With Meciar

AU0304115195 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 28 Mar 95 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "Caution Is Required Regarding the Summit With Meciar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is just another in a series of Meciar's ever more time-worn tricks: Before meeting with Prime Minister Klaus, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia chairman asked for an apology for President Havel's criticism of Slovakia, thus generating the impression that Prague had only one desire, the Czech-Slovak meeting. If there is anyone, however, who needs this summit, then it is Meciar, who longs to boost his political stock from the outside, which is not faring too well.

The Slovak prime minister does not seem to realize that it is now 1995, not 1992. The common state was in its last throws then and, in the interest of a safe partition, it was necessary to handle Meciar with kid gloves and patiently dismiss his often crazy ideas. Today, however, Vaclav Klaus should weigh up very carefully when, indeed whether, he should meet with the head of the most inscrutable government in Central Europe.

It should not be Meciar, but Prague that sets the conditions. It would be good, for instance, not to rush the date, until the Slovak Government comes up with a specific idea of how it plans to pay off its now 24-billion-koruna debt resulting from the partition of the federation. But if discussion of the clearing account is to be the only key item on the summit's agenda, it is precious little.

It can hardly be expected that Klaus will convince Meciar solely through his charm to alter the value of the currency, which is putting Czech exporters at a disadvantage. Moreover, if Minister Kocarnik is right in saying that the clearing account is obsolete, then we can do away with it without nothing-solving summit sessions with Bratislava.

The main reason why Slovakia should be approached cautiously is, however, political. Meciar rules with partners, comparable in the Czech situation perhaps only to Sladekites [extreme right-wingers] and Grebencikites [extreme left-wingers]. If the coalition threatens the expulsion, for instance, of part of the opposition from the parliament, we should refrain from any gesture that could be even remotely interpreted as leniency toward Meciar's political xenophobia.

This summit, without any specific agenda or results, might then look like an uninhibited chat with a good friend. This certainly is something that Meciar and his buddies cannot be for us.

Responsibilities of Intelligence Services Outlined

95CH0168B Prague RESPEKT in Czech 13-19 Feb 95 p 10

[Article by Jaroslav Spurny: "Czech Intelligence Services"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, the Czech Republic has altogether three intelligence services: Office for Foreign Contacts and Information (espionage) [UZSI], Military Intelligence Service [VZS], and Security Information Service (counterespionage) [BIS].

The most important politically is BIS, which was formally established in January 1993. Its predecessors were first the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy (1990), followed by the Federal Security Information Service (1991). There has been a succession of six directors of counterespionage (Formanek, Ruml, Muller, Novotny, Bacinsky, Slovak); at present, the latest director is the former dissident Stanislav Devaty. BIS is located in Majakovskeho Street in Prague-Dejvice, it has 600 employees dispersed throughout the entire republic, and its official budget is 800 million korunas. The main task of BIS is the "protection of the constitutional order."

UZSI was established in 1991 and is directly under the Ministry of Interior. It is located in Prague-Kobylisy, its budget is secret, as is the number of its employees. All of them, with the exception of director Oldrich Cerny (director since 1993) go under their cover names in public. According to accessible information, UZSI does not have a network of agents at its disposal at present, and the substance of its work consists of analyzing the so-called open sources (press, personal conversations, etc.). Its basic task is to gather information related to a possible external threat to the Czech Republic (terrorism, organized crime, nationalistic organizations).

Military intelligence group VZS was established last year by merging the Military Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Services of the General Staff (incidentally: until 1992, they were directed by their pre-November chief General Kozojed). It is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, and therefore is located in the ministry itself. Its budget is not known. Its director is a political prisoner from the fifties and former chief of UZSI Radovan Prochazka. Eight hundred of its employees—of those 24 are military and air attaches in important embassies—have the task of monitoring possible military danger to the Czech Republic.

Military To Receive U.S. Advice on Air Defense

95CH0172B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 21 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Brandan McNally: "Czech Military To Get U.S. Advice"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A special team of U.S. military advisers is being established to help bring the Czech army closer in line with its new Western partners, senior Czech and U.S. military officials announced February 10.

The team, assembled at the request of Defense Minister Vilem Holan, will advise the Czech military on such matters as establishing NATO-compatible air sovereignty and communications and command centers.

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Following a two-day series of meetings with Holan and Army Chief of Staff Jifi Nekvasil, Lt. Gen. Richard Keller, who heads the U.S. forces in Europe, announced that the team was being created in Stuttgart, Germany.

While Keller refused to speculate on whether the Czech Republic, which is enrolled in the alliance's Partnership for Peace program, would become a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization before 2006, he emphasized that "these practical military matters are certainly steps leading in that direction."

"We discussed practical matters, and I gave [Holan and Nekvasil] a report on practical steps that could be taken," Keller said. "We've formed a team, and we have just now agreed on the names of who will be on it."

Holan said that on the Czech side, a military commission has been formed to work with the U.S. team.

Formation of the U.S. military advisory body comes exactly one month after high-level military and civilian officials from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary met at a Pentagon-sponsored conference in Trencin, Slovakia, and agreed to develop jointly unified systems for air defense and to manage air traffic.

Pay Raises Will Slow Future Capital Inflows

95CH0172A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 15 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by Alexander Sparkmeister: "Pay Rise Slows Relocation Flood"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Foreign investors may still flock to the low-wage Czech Republic, but a renowned German business expert says that low worker costs could be history within 15 years.

"By the year 2006, wages should be about half the level of those in Germany," says Helmut Aufdermauer of Transfer Projekt GmbH, a company that advises companies investing in Eastern Europe.

German wages are, on average, the highest in the world. "By 2010-11," Aufdermauer says, "the wage levels could be the same [in the Czech Republic and Germany]."

Although a Czech monetary revaluation or pay fluctuations in either country could slow this trend down. Aufdermauer says that his statistics, based on recent Czech and German wage histories, illustrate how some German business leaders have lowered their expectations.

For Germany, the Czech Republic's most important trading partner, the gold-rush days are over. For instance, the February 6 issue of the German magazine DER SPIEGEL reported that the expected deluge of German firms eastward has instead turned out to be a small stream.

"The high point [of German investment] has already been reached," says Jurgen Mollering, head of the Czech-German Chamber of Commerce in Prague. "The number of inquiries about the Czech Republic is decreasing."

Mollering says that German business people already complain that the Czech Republic is "no longer interesting" because it has become too expensive. The difference in costs between the Czech Republic and Germany is decreasing, Mollering says, adding that growing competition from other, cheaper countries takes away from the republic's luster.

"As a result, instead of direct investment, we're seeing more cooperative ventures," he says.

The Czech Republic certainly remains one of Germany's extended workbenches, but that could change if labor-intensive industries move farther east while capital-intensive industries become entrenched.

"With some industries, like cheap clothing production, you shouldn't build a factory, you should build a tent," Aufdermauer says. Such "circus" firms simply continue on to the next low-wage country while more high-tech industries such as mechanical engineering stay firmly planted.

"There is a better possibility for that here," Aufdermauer says, "because the Czechs have had a long tradition in this area."

In the long run, Aufdermauer adds, the Czechs' vanishing low-wage advantage shouldn't be a problem for the Germans.

"The Czech Republic will become a market [for German products] and not just a production site," Aufdermauer says.

Mollering says this is an aspect overlooked by many German business leaders who fear that opening factories in Central and Eastern Europe will mean the loss of German jobs.

The current mood contrasts with a survey the Czech-German Chamber of Commerce took 18 months ago, when fully a third of the firms surveyed in Germany said they were interested in moving all or some of their production facilities to the Czech Republic.

"Fortunately, that didn't happen," says Aufdermauer. "This economy couldn't have sustained it."

For now, the economies of countries farther east may not be ready to handle much German business, either. Though many executives want to use the Czech Republic as a springboard to the east, Mollering says this is insufficient reason to move here.

"That's a factor that won't matter until later," he says. "Right now, the Eastern countries don't have the resources or funds to handle much business."

Jochen Kauffmann, a management assistant at AKRA AG in the south Bohemian city of Ceske Budejovice, adds, "I've heard so much about this springboard idea, but in my experience it has been very disappointing."

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Meciar Rejects Concept of 'Ethnic Border'

LD3103194195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 31 Mar 95

[Regular Friday interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Pavol Sveton; in Bratislava; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Sveton] Prime Minister, welcome to the High Tatras. Let us begin with our internal political scene. At the national congress of Coexistence the idea of an autonomy for Hungarians in south Slovakia as well as the intention to push it through were expressed. [passage omitted] What position will you take on that issue?

[Meciar] The question calls for several answers. The territory of the Slovak Republic is indivisible. The rights of the minorities are understood as human and civic rights. The Slovak Republic is a home for its citizens—be they Slovaks, be they citizens of all other nationalities—it is not their step-mother.

In Slovakia we will not carry out any separation on ethnic principles. In Slovakia we will not create any autonomies.

The proposals put forward by Coexistence are extreme, they are basically the same as an attempt to isolate the blacks from the whites and vice versa. They want to build an ethnic border between the Slovaks and Hungarians. This is bad for all people living in South Slovakia. [passage omitted]

[Sveton] Another problem for the government to deal with is the big drop in the number of self-employed people. Of 300,000 registered self-employed people, 18,000 returned their licenses by mid-March. These figures have been quoted recently by the Party of Self-Employed and Businessmen officials. [passage omitted] Do you intend to change attitudes and reassess the relevant laws?

[Meciar] A relatively large number of licences are returned at the end of each year. Altogether, 25,318 licences were returned by 15 March 1995. At the same time, 16,795 new licences have been issued. Hence, on 15 March 1995 there are 327,775 valid licenses of self-employed people. [passage omitted]

New Territorial Administration

LD3103171295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Problems of self-administration bodies and coordination of their work with the work of state administration are on the agenda of today's meeting between the Cabinet led by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and the representatives of the Association of Towns and Villages of Slovakia, headed by its chairman, Michal Sykora. Today's meeting held in Strbske Pleso is a follow-up of the first round of talks held in the High Tatras in February this year. Our correspondent Pavol Sveton has more details.

[Sveton] [Passage omitted] It seems to me—and this is a much discussed point—that the crucial problem will be that of the future territorial and administrative division of Slovakia. That is likely to be the most difficult task.

[Begin Meciar recording] We base our concept of territorial administration on the integrity and indivisibility of the Slovak Republic's territory. The fact that regions ceased to exist in 1990 and the fact that they were not replaced by another tier, compels us to define once again territorial units and areas and, given our present options, we must state what will they be like. [passage omitted]

I think that by the end of the year we should be able to say what the future set up will be so that it is acceptable to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. A wider public consensus is needed in this respect, though, because our intention is to bring the administration closer to citizens. [end recording]

Kiev Visit Postponed

AU0304112495 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 31 Mar 95 p 1

["bap"-attributed report: "Slovak Prime Minister's Visit Postponed Due to Turmoil in Kiev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava— Prime Minister Meciar's two-day visit to Ukraine, planned for next week, has been postponed. As sources in Kiev and, subsequently, also in Bratislava confirmed to NARODNA OBRODA, the postponement of the visit, which had been scheduled for 4-5 April, was unexpectedly requested by the Ukrainian side yesterday.

At his news conference on Tuesday, 28 March, Prime Minister Meciar spoke about his visit to Kiev as though it were a fait accompli. He said that he would be accompanied by all ministers in charge of economic departments and by a group of businessmen.

What is the reason for this sudden decision by the Ukrainian side? "The reasons are of a purely domestic political nature," official sources in Kiev stated yesterday in response to our query. As we have ascertained, behind the postponement lies the possible fall of the present Ukrainian government of Prime Minister Marchuk, who is supported by President Kuchma's reform team.

According to a 28 March decision by the leadership of parliament, which is controlled by conservative forces, the government's fall might be discussed at the 4 April meeting of the Supreme Council.

Committee Sees Freedom of Speech Imperiled

AU0304101495 Bratislava SME in Slovak 28 Mar 95 p 4

[Statement by the Slovak Helsinki Committee: "Topical Threat"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] In recent weeks and months, the Slovak Helsinki Committee (SHV) has been following with apprehension signs of restriction of freedom of speech, particularly politically motivated personnel changes in public corporation television and radio, which have resulted in one-sided television and radio news programs, and the abolition of all satirical programs on Slovak Television. Plurality of information is one of the key guarantees of the democratic development of every society and the electronic media is beyond doubt the decisive source of information. The SHV is therefore emphatically joining the many voices calling attention to those signals. The SHV was relieved that the bill on discriminatory taxation of Slovak periodicals in which foreign capital is involved did not appear on the agenda of the last meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], but it expresses solidarity with the statement published by the Association of Periodical Press Publishers and the Syndicate of Slovak Journalists warning against this step. Representatives of the ruling coalition have not yet dissociated themselves in principle from the intention to discriminate against the critical press as a step endangering press freedom, and the SHV therefore considers the expressions of alarm to be still appropriate.

A few days ago saw the 56th anniversary of the founding of the first Slovak Republic. While the SHV does not dare ascribe any attributes to this state, we want to draw attention to the fact that more than 70,000 of its Jewish and Romany citizens perished in concentration camps during its existence. One of the people directly responsible for this mass crime was then Interior Minister Alexander Mach. On 14 January 1995 the Slovak Heritage Foundation organized for the young generation a seminar in Piestany, whose aim was to actualize Mach's pronouncements and the ideology of the first Slovak state. The seminar was held exactly 50 years after another event, the 14 January 1945 Piestany "Congress of the Young Ludakist Generation," the militant wing of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party [HSLS]. This was a HSLS wing that contended, inter alia, that the Jewish question should have been dealt with more consistently and rigorously and that tougher action should have been taken to suppress the [Slovak National] Uprising. The congress documents were published by some Slovak dailies. The SHV publicly calls on Mr. Jozef Markus, chairman of the Slovak Heritage Foundation, to explain what made the Slovak Heritage Foundation organize this demonstration of spiritual continuity with representatives of fascism. The SHV also calls on NRSR Chairman Ivan Gasparovic to explain why he, a constitutional official, participated in the above seminar. As a representative of the civic public, the SHV has an obligation to condemn any continuity with fascist elements of our national history. Building on these elements manifests contempt for the basic human right of tens of thousands of victims—the right to life.

[On 29 March, on page 4, Bratislava SME in Slovak publishes a 400-word statement issued by three Slovak civic organizations—the Helsinki Civic Assembly, the Slovak Union for Peace and Human Rights, and the Slovak Society for the Defense of Democracy and Humanism—in response to an exhibition entitled "Altoetting—Place of Pilgrimage for Slovaks Living Abroad," which opened in the Museum of the Slovak Heritage Foundation in Bratislava "last week," in the presence of Education Minister Eva Slavkovska. According to the statement, "a substantial part of this exhibition serves the glorification of Doctor Tiso," president of the World War II Slovak state. The signatories of the statement call on the Slovak Government and parliament, "which morally and financially support the activity of the Slovak Heritage Foundation," to "take an unambiguous stand" on the exhibition and warn that their failure to dissociate themselves from the event might "provoke a negative response from democratic countries in Europe and the rest of the world."]

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Union Leader Presents Alternative Package

AU0204150695 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 30 Mar 95 pp 1, 6

[Interview with MSZOSZ Chairman Sandor Nagy by Tibor Franka; place and date not given: "What Is in the MSZOSZ's Package—The Bokros Program's Counterweight"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a certain sense, we are a rich country, because as soon as the official government package on cutting welfare expenditure was drawn up, under Finance Minister Lajos Bokros's name, another package has come—one that is being prepared by the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ] under Chairman Sandor Nagy's leadership. We asked Nagy what kind of easing of conditions people can expect from the MSZOSZ's package.

[Nagy] Ours will only be better in the sense that it will be somewhat more tolerable. The main point of our concept is to find, mainly within the child support system, a flexible solution, instead of the rigid idea that the needy should receive support and no one should receive anything above a certain limit. In our view, we need finer criteria. The other problem is that today in Hungary, the validity of income certificates is, to put it mildly, questionable in all areas apart from those made out for employees of the government, large companies, and local government. This is a key issue. Indirectly, it also follows from this that when there is little money, then it should be given to the needy. Payments have to be reduced in other categories, and some people should not receive anything. The crux of the matter is to find a solution that would not become a source of more social injustice. On the other hand, we have to seek possibilities of reducing expenditure and increasing revenue. The MSZOSZ's basic stance is that increasing the burdens of waged or salaried people is not the only possible way to the solution. We must be thinking about measures that will launch income-generating growth in the economy; otherwise it is in vain to cancel even all welfare spending, because it would only improve the balance for six months at the most.

[Franka] The slogan 10 years ago was that we must restrict the black market economy, self-employed people, and so on. Life will not become better if we now use the same slogan to calm down the masses—because rather than taking things away from those who have, we should establish and give opportunity to those who have not.

[Nagy] In addition to the financial, moral, political, and economic reasons, the black market economy has to be captured because it sits on the legal economy and causes tremendous damage in the following ways: It hides large amounts of income from tax and duty payments, which constantly increases the burdens in the legal sphere—or at least these cannot be reduced. In addition, it deepens the differences of property and income, which makes it even more difficult for low- or modest-income people to live through the forced situation that the country is in now. Very many incomes exist in Hungary that are based on evasion of tax or duties, or on lack of performance. These irritate society in both an economic and a social sense, and they worsen the economic situation.

[Franka] Many people try to run honest businesses but their taxes are so high that, should they have to be even more honest, they would have to close their business—but this would not make us live any better.

[Nagy] Making the burdens of companies realistic and bearable is a key to action against the black market economy. The black market economy is encouraged and maintained by two factors: the unbearably high burdens and the high level of unemployment. These go hand in hand.... We must calmly begin work to dismantle this magic circle. This is important because I do not believe that this is a police, jurisdictional, or tax office issue, and we must now clamp down on it. It is important to have a strict tax office and to notice obvious tax evaders, but it is even more important to set the burdens at a realistic level—and the proportion of the social insurance contribution is the most important factor in this. On this basis, the black market economy will first become semi-legal and then legal. The time will come when it is more worthwhile to operate legally and pay tax then to take risks in concealing the income. This is a long process and will not be over in two days. However, it has to be seen that obvious and gross—how shall I put it?—major fraud cases involving large amounts of money, cases that are not at all linked to the above situation, exist on the peripheries of this complicated issue.

[Franka] Fraud can only be committed if the circumstances are favorable for it.

[Nagy] When someone stashes away billions through, let us say, falsifying oil, then this is a completely different category from not paying social insurance contributions. The issue of the black market economy can only be seriously solved in a country if society's bigger half cooperates. We can cite a simple example. Everyone complains about the black market economy, but when he too would be affected by something, then he says this measure should not be introduced. Finally, as for differences in income, I also believe that most of our energy should be spent on how people's income can be increased, rather than how we could take money away from someone. This is a different approach and I agree with it. However, I do not believe that the market economy solves all existing social problems—as has been proved by history. The point is that, in terms of efficiency, no one has yet invented a better system. If they had, then the world would not be as it is.

[Franka] Can you see a chance for the MSZOSZ package to be taken seriously by those who will receive it?

[Nagy] We have a chance until a firm decision is made. The original plans could at least be amended. In our case,

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there is a chance for the MSZOSZ to alleviate the life circumstances of people with wages and salaries through this package.

Government Accepts U.S. Aid For Center Update

LD3103220595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The government will accept U.S. aid of $6 million that the Army can use for the modernization of the Flight Control Center. This was said by Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti at a press briefing in Nyiregyhaza. Keleti also that the ministry will hold negotiations with the miltary trade union about the planned lay-off of several thousand people.

The minister also said that the training of the first Hungarian peacekeeping force has been completed. Its members are expected to be deployed on Cyprus or in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Major General on PFP Language Training Center

95CH0176C Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian 24 Feb 95 p 16

[Interview with Major General Jozsef Hollo by Attila Marton; place and date not given: "Military Language-Training Center—The Benefits of Training"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Unfortunately, regardless of how much we may wish it, the Hungarian language has not become a world language, although it seems that something can be done for this cause. One could read here and there lately that the Peace Partner Military Language-Training Center, the first of its kind in East Europe, will open in Hungary.*

Certainly, this will not cause everyone in the West to scramble to learn Hungarian, but it is also certain that it will allow us to sneak into the language-training system of NATO countries—which is no small accomplishment.

Incidentally, according to the news, the very creation and operation of the center will cost a considerable amount of money, and because time is pressing, the Defense Ministry should make a decision quickly as to whether we have a need for this center.

We asked General Jozsef Hollo, who took part in the work from the very beginning, whether the language-training center will open on 1 September, 1995, and if yes, who will be trained there, and for what.

[Marton] The Defense Ministry has decided has to create the center and to open it on 1 September, 1995. Do you think that, in view of the shortness of time, there is a realistic possibility for beginning instruction on 1 September?

[Hollo] The plans are ready, the money is available, and there is no reason why this center should not open its doors in the commander's building of the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy in a few months. Incidentally, there was a lot of guessing earlier as to its site. The main reason for selecting the Academy was that it offered the least expensive alternative for creating a language-training base that met the requirements but that, however, is completely independent of the Academy.

[Marton] Who will be trained, and for what, at this center?

[Hollo] After starting full operation, we expect that this institution will have 100-120 students, 40-60 of whom would be coming from neighboring countries. But this will take some time. We expect 30 Hungarian freshman students on 1 September 1995; then, in January 1996, we will be able to accommodate 20 foreign students in our four-month courses. Incidentally, there is a rather high interest in the center, i.e., in Romania, Slovakia, and Poland.

Students from these countries, as well as students coming from other countries, will be able to choose between English, French, and German, but if the need arises, we will be able to start other languages as well.

As far as admission is concerned, every student will be required to have a command of their chosen language at a moderately advanced level. Of course, the individual countries will select their own students to be sent to us.

We are primarily planning to train officers who are involved in NATO's continued training and the cooperation with the armies of NATO countries, officers who are expected to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, soldiers working in the areas of arms control and disarmament, and diplomats to be sent abroad.

It must be stressed that training in this center will consist of continued and preparatory training rather than traditional language-training. We want to select the faculty accordingly. We expect that the most highly qualified faculty of our institutions of higher education and at least 25-28 foreign teachers will teach at the center.

Through the work done at the language-training center, we also would like to help expand our budding relations with countries that participate in the "Partners for Peace" program and with NATO, and to help alleviate present difficulties in communication. In addition, the center will provide an opportunity to process the conventional symbols, abbreviations, and documents that have been developed in NATO's military command, and to teach characteristic linguistic phrases. It is also significant that we will have the opportunity to adopt the experiences and methods that NATO countries have accumulated in their language-training.

In addition, we would also like to develop a system of long-distance electronic instruction through the development of the language center's audiovisual network. Thanks to this system, with the help of a long-distance

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electronic instruction program, it will be possible to offer language-training to officers stationed at bases located in the countryside.

Incidentally, the language-training center will maintain direct contact with NATO's language-training center as well.

[Marton] It has been only a few months now that the public has been aware of the idea of a language-training center. Does this idea really have such a short history?

[Hollo] Yes and no. In mid-November, 1994, the creation of a language-training center was among the possible contributions by the "Partners for Peace" program. Of course, that package included concrete ideas, and it was up to NATO to decide which would get the green light. Fortunately, the NATO countries welcomed the idea from the very beginning, and soon it became apparent that they would participate in the instruction of English and French.

At that time, an earnest military diplomatic reconciliation was launched, under the leadership of Deputy State Secretary Tibor Toth, which resulted in the promise that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and Canada would provide concrete help in equipping the training center's language labs. For instance, the United States offered $1 million for the creation of the center.

Incidentally, much work has been invested in these results, and Colonels Zoltan Martinusz and Csaba Halasz, Colonel Nandor Gruber, Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Istvan Szilard, and members of the staff's operations group command played key roles.

[Marton] One more, closing, question. How much will all this cost us?

[Hollo] Parliament, i.e., the National Defense Committee, approved a certain sum for financing this program. According to our calculations, the cost of opening the language-training center will amount to 190 million forints, and its annual budget will be 250 million to 300 million forints. Of course, these are no small sums, but this institution will bring much bigger benefits to our country—benefits that it is not possible to express in terms of forints.

Military Higher Education 'Crisis' Discussed

95CH0176E Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian 17 Feb 95 p 32

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Laszlo Fulop, former senior member of the Defense Ministry's Committee on Education and Science: "How Far Along Is Military Higher Education?" txt
[FBIS Translated Text] This question could also be asked this way: Where is it going? And we could give the answer that has been repeated for years: toward Hungarian, European higher education. The process the purpose of which was to make military higher education—which is "de jure" considered a college or university but which does not meet, in its functions and structure (and sometimes in its contents), the requirements of the law—an integral part of Hungarian higher education, is coming to an end.

Because of the decision of the Defense Ministry board, which was the result of lobbying (in the pejorative sense), the range of action of progressive experts who are involved and interested in this issue has decreased. After long hesitation (resulting from internal power struggles), the decisionmakers voted in favor of the creation of a structure that will exclude itself at the moment of its implementation from the setting its predecessor penetrated through decent work (and sometimes through legal loopholes that were opened through peremptory orders).

This version does not meet the provisions of a single statute that is in effect.

What, then, is the essence of this issue? The institutions of higher learning would continue to function as military organizations but outside the ranks of the military, under the commander of the National Defense Forces. On the other hand, the minister of defense would be the employer of education department heads. One does not have to be an expert to see that such an organization is a distorted thing, unable to function. Instead of having autonomy (which is absolutely necessary in higher education), an institution that is managed through detailed regulations, orders, and guidelines will be a poor successor of the present one as well.

What did military higher education do in the area of requirements for accreditation and of higher standards?

One must say precious little, although not entirely through its own fault. There was pseudoactivity under duress. Aside from the return to four-year training (which can be evaluated as recognition of the faulty 1987 decision), it attempted to maneuver between the contradictions of the set requirements and the chain of command—trying to meet the requirements of both while expecting a miracle.

The Miklos Zrinyi MIlitary Academy, which is "de jure" operated as a university, "de facto" still does not have any departments. Although the academy council exists in name, it cannot adequately exercise its rights as provided by the law on higher education. A commander, with sole responsibility, takes the place of the rector, under the supervision of the chief of staff. The situation is similar at the other colleges—perhaps a little better, as the Janos Bolyai Military Technical College (somewhere between prohibition and toleration) may cooperate with the civil engineering colleges (Budapest Polytechnic Institute).

All this is nothing but the tip of the iceberg. The crisis is much more serious.

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Especially if we look at the essential issues. Aside from the Academy, no other institution paid enough attention to the development of a highly qualified faculty that meets all requirements of the law. At the Szolnok College of Aviation, certain "experts" attempted to award traffic engineering degrees to naval officers without having spent a minute with mathematics as required by the program. At the Kossuth Academy, the engineering-education programs are still running even though the conditions for them are less than adequate, and everyone knows that a different training should be in order for effectively developing the qualities of a commander.

The plans of the designers of the organizational changes in the National Defense Forces include the reunification of Bolyai and Kossuth, modeled after the onetime United Officer School. And they would do it as if these institutions were military organizations—troops—and not public institutions of higher learning.

We could cite endless examples but perhaps these will suffice for raising the question: Who is against the implementation of a real reform and why?

First of all, the organizations whose responsibility and exclusive task is to manage the institutions of higher learning. For them, military higher learning is primarily an issue of livelihood. Their livelihood would the threatened if military colleges were to become autonomous and manageable institutions of learning, under limited ministerial supervision—instead of "outfits" whose primary responsibility is to perform military tasks. It is difficult to judge the viewpoints of the present heads of the institutions on the basis of their deeds and words. What their professional ego dictates is that progress can be made only through a complete implementation of the law on higher education. On the other hand, it is better for them not to be subjected, as individual commanders, to committee evaluations, and not to have their will clash with the opinions of democratic structures.

Albeit indirectly, the faculty's interests are also against the reforms. The present situation is "comfortable," one need not continually compete on the professional stage, scholarly work and continued training are not monitored very closely, and one can view—as if from the outside—the competition that is so natural in higher learning.

There is only one person who has an interest in revival: the student.

For the subject of the training, the ideal school would be one that is socially accepted, one that offers transferable knowledge, a military institution where the training offered would qualify the student for an efficient performance of duties, for professional advancement and, in some cases, for a career change—for social changes do not circumvent the National Defense Forces. "Job security" is not guaranteed anymore—especially not without self-education and professional development.

Hungarian higher education cannot ignore this issue either, although it may seem that way. What it can, and will be able to, accomplish through its efforts to come up to standards and improve its operations under increasingly strict requirements will make a difference in an eventual international evaluation of our military higher education

Also, from this point on, military higher education is not the internal affair of the defense ministry, let alone of the National Defense Forces. This is a social issue, a public issue, and someone should finally stand guard. If the defense ministry does not do it, perhaps the ministry of culture and public education may find it appropriate to take over. Otherwise the defense mechanisms and exclusive reflexes of fellow institutions may start up, forcing officer training again to become inbred—the result of which will be a chronic shortage of officers, which surely is not desired by the National Defense Forces either.

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Solidarity Warns Government About Privatization

LD0204100095 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 0900 GMT 2 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The trade union Solidarity demands a halt to capital privatization and the introduction of universal enfranchisement, union leader Marian Krzaklewski has written in a letter to Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. The content of the letter was agreed upon by Solidarity representatives from just under 100 plants earmarked for capital privatization. The trade unionists are also demanding the implementation of the Enterprise Pact decisions regarding privatization and an urgent referendum on the constitution and enfranchisement. Marian Krzaklewski:

[[Begin Krzaklewski recording] I sent a letter to the prime minister with this kind of warning to the government: that when it prepares decisions, it should clearly take into account that if these issues are not resolved and Solidarity's demands are not taken into account in the government's plans, in the plans of the decision-makers, then we will take all possible action, all feasible statutory action, to oppose this kind of dogmatic process. [end recording]

No Progress Seen in Church-State Talks

LD0104124395 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 1 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of the joint government and episcopate commission has ended in Warsaw after deliberations lasting over two hours. Statements by Cardinal Jozef Glemp and Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy do not indicate any progress on the issue of the ratification of the Concordat.

[Correspondent Marek Kassa] In brief statements the primate and the prime minister emphasized the importance of today's meeting, which, according to the two, proceeded in a good atmosphere and opened a new stage in the work of the joint commission. They said that the talks were frank and no difficult issues had been avoided, which, in the view of Cardinal Jozef Glemp, generate a search for solutions.

The prime minister pointed out that the differences of opinion have their social significance. In this context, Jozef Oleksy admitted that the issue of the Concordat was discussed. All aspects of this issue, present and future, have been reviewed.

After the prime minister and primate's statements, a group of correspondents was unanimous in the view that enigmatic words by both of them show that there is no agreement on the key issues.

Statistics Office Contradicts U.S. Figures

WS0304112795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish on 3 April publishes on page 17 a report signed by Washington-based correspondent Jacek Kalabinski and "jap" on a report issued by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The U.S. report claims that the United States had a negative trade balance with Poland in 1994. GAZETA WYBORCZA quotes figures published by the Polish Central Office of Statistics (GUS) which indicate the contrary—that Poland had a negative trade balance with the United States. The U.S. report claims Polish imports from the United States fell by 15.1 percent, while GUS figures show that they fell by nearly one- third. The U.S. document claims Polish exports to the United States grew by 42.2 percent, while GUS maintains they grew by 43.3 percent.

The GAZETA WYBORCZA article compares the figures:

According to U.S. sources, imports were $625 million, while exports amounted to $651 million. According to Polish sources, imports totalled $827.4 million and exports were $584.7 million.

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Explosion Said Cause of Death in Airplane Crash

AU0304121095 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 3 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sorin Stoicescu, general inspector of the Civil Aviation Authority and chairman of the commission investigating the A-310 crash at Balotesti near Bucharest on 31 March, has told our correspondent that examination of data and material from the area of the accident and of the voice and flight recorders continues in the presence of the members of specialized subcomissions.

At a news conference today at the Medical-Legal Institute, Dr. Vladimir Belis, director of the institute, said that the victims had died before impact with the ground, the cause of death having been an explosion in the air.

The autopsy of a part of the recovered human remains indicates that death was not caused by fire, as would have been normal had the explosion occurred on the ground. We remind listeners that in an interview with our station, Sorin Stoicescu, chairman of the investigation commission, did not exclude the possibility of an explosion. He stressed, however, that evidence is still being gathered, and the exact cause of the disaster will be established later.

Bomb Threat

AU0304115395 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 3 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest Otopeni International Airport received an anonymous call at 0904 [0604 GMT] announcing a bomb on board Flight RO-381 from Bucharest to Paris, which took off from the airport at 0835. The TAROM [Romanian Airlines] management directed the flight to Timisoara International Airport, where the plane landed at 0929 and underwent inspection.

At the same time Constantin Tudose, director of Bucharest Otopeni International Airport, ordered an inspection of the airport, aircraft, offices, airport services, and areas where passengers check in and undergo security control. After the relevant inspection procedures had been completed, the first flight, from Bucharest to Brussels, took off at 1130.

Otopeni Airport Director Tudose and Tarom Vice President Gheorghe Racaru told our correspondent Ion Marinescu today that all aircraft operations and airport services are proceeding normally.

Constantin Tudose also mentioned that the anonymous calls refer exclusively to Tarom. Nevertheless, both the staff of the company and the staff responsible for ancillary operations are in a state of constant vigilance to ensure the complete safety of airport and flight operations.

The work and state of mind of the entire staff are not affected or intimidated by these actions.

Solidarity Rally for Hunger Striker Organized

AU0104200695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of solidarity with television trade union leader Dumitru Iuga, who has been on a hunger strike for 30 days, began today in Bucharest at 1400 hours in front of the headquarters of Romanian Television in the Calea Dorobantilor, our correspondent Laurentiu Vaduva reports. The pickets of protesters from the 21 December Association and the Drivers Solidarity Association, who are standing watch nonstop day and night in front of Romanian Television, were joined by representatives of the Association of December 1989 Fighters, the Association of Former Political Detainees [AFDPR], the League of Students, the Civic Alliance [AC], the National Liberal Party [PNL], and the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD].

On this occasion, a delegation consisting of Messrs. Corneliu Coposu [PNTCD president], Ticu Dumitrescu [AFDPR president], Octavian Paler [director of the daily ROMANIA LIBERA], Alexandru Paleologu [Civic Alliance Party,PAC, senator], and Claudiu Iordache [leader of the Social Solidarity Convention,CSS] talked to trade union leader Dumitru Iuga and also got in touch with the members of the management of Romanian Television, to whom they presented the protest of the demonstrators as well as their solidarity with the actions of the Free Trade Union of Radio and Television Employees, led by Dumitru Iuga.

At this time, the number of the demonstrators in front of the TV headquarters has reached about 3,500. They are chanting slogans of solidarity with Dumitru Iuga, as well as anti-governmental and anti-president slogans. No incidents between protesters and the public order people have been reported.

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Zubak Doubts Izetbegovic Sincere About Federation

LD3103173495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1425 GMT 31 Mar 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 31 (TANJUG)—President of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Kresimir Zubak, a Croat, said in Mostar on Thursday that Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic was not sincerely for the Federation.

The Zagreb press on Friday quoted Zubak as telling a news conference that Izetbegovic had clearly demonstrated this with his latest actions, including his failure to attend the recent observance in the U.S. of the first anniversary of the agreement on the Muslim-Croat Federation. The Bosnian Croat official said Izetbegovic's units had killed Croat clergymen, destroyed Croat churches and committed other crimes against Croats.

The agreement on the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed under strong pressure from the U.S. in Washington in March 1994, after a year of fierce mutual fighting for territories with mixed populations. Zubak said Izetbegovic, leader of only a part of the Bosnian Muslims, was talking about a 'multi-ethnic army' but at the same time inspecting mujahedin units, including in the town of Zenica recently.

Izetbegovic has increasingly been bringing up the idea of a 'Federation of cantons,' which is nothing other than a modified version of the concepts of Bosnia-Herzegovina which suit only the Muslim side, Zubak said. He stated that the Bosnian Muslim military and political leaderships bore full responsibility for the recent killing in Western Bosnia of Bosnian Croat General Vlado Santic.

Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Bosnian Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosnia Ivan Bender on Friday said he, too, doubted that the Muslim side sincerely wanted the Muslim-Croat Federation. Bender said on Radio Herceg-Bosnia that Bosnian Muslims would 'do anything to create their own Muslim state.'

Ganic: Mandate 'Must Be More Precisely Defined'

AU0104145095 Paris AFP in English 1331 GMT 1 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 1 (AFP)—Bosnian Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic Saturday [1 April] welcomed the renewal of the UN mandate for Bosnia, but added that it must be more precisely defined. "We want the UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) mandate to be fixed more precisely," he told AFP.

"We're not looking for a change of mandate, but for clarification of the mandate," he said, adding that his government had asked for clarification of the mission of UN forces and what "can they do and what they cannot do" by the end of April.

A working group has been set up in New York to look into the details of the UNPROFOR mission, he added. The UN Security Council on Friday voted to maintain peacekeepers in Bosnia and Croatia for at least eight months under a revised structure.

The world body, facing a midnight expiration of the UNPROFOR mandate in the former Yugoslavia, agreed to split the peace-keeping force into three separate operations for Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

The mandates for the UN troops in Bosnia and Macedonia remain unchanged, while in Croatia, the broad outlines of the new mandate are to implement the ceasefire arranged a year ago along with an economic accord struck in December between government and secessionist Serb forces. The Croatian mandate also calls for the UN's supervision of the country's international borders.

The Security Council was expected to vote on another resolution in late April to fix the number of troops in Croatia and the terms of their operation. Diplomats said their number could be reduced from the current 12,000 to 8,000. Some of the surplus troops might be transferred from Croatia to Bosnia, UN officials said here Saturday.

RSK's Martic Unhappy With UNSC Resolution

LD3103174295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1641 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 31 Mar (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], sent a letter today to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali warning him that the draft of the new UN Security Council resolution on peace forces does not take into consideration the real state of affairs and Knin's proposals and demands.

Martic stressed that the draft resolution contains provisions unacceptable to the RSK, as they negate basic provisions of the Vance plan, primarily the very fact that Croatia is not an internationally recognized country when the document was signed. "By this act the UN peace forces are being given a new mandate whose main function is to impose a political solution, which is unacceptable to the RSK," Martic said adding that it is a well known fact that Croatia has never had sovereignty over Krajina.

The RSK president warns Butrus-Ghali that the change of name into the forces for the restoration of trust would strip the blue helmets of their role as protection forces, which was the main reason for their deployment. The RSK would thus be put in a subordinate position in the negotiating process, Martic says.

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With regard to the possible deployment of peace forces along the border between the RSK and the Srpska republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Martic recalls that the RSK earlier assumed the position that it does not have anything against the deployment of UN forces throughout its territory, but without them taking over control [kontrola] of borders and being placed above the legitimate RSK state authorities. "I would like to inform you that ignoring the RSK stands would bring into question our acceptance of the deployent of peace forces in the RSK," Martic's consequences this would have on peace in this area.

Defense Minister Prlic Opposes Belgrade-Pale Tie

AU3003153695 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 30 Mar 95 p 7

[Interview with Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister and defense minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and "prime minister" of Herceg-Bosnia, by Azra Kaurin in Zagreb; date not given: "There Can Be No Agreement Without the Croats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After a meeting at the presidential palace in Zagreb, where the delegation of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosnia was received by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, we talked to Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister and defense minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and prime minister of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosnia. Prlic is one of the leading politicians participating in important meetings on the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Dr. Prlic assessed the latest meeting at the presidential palace:

The Federation—The Optimum of Croatian Interests

[Prlic] The talks represent a continuation within the framework of talks of the entire Croatian people: the Croats who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian state leadership, whether people like it or not. Basically, the Croats as a whole carry out a unique Croatian state policy. We have again concluded during the talks that the Federation represents the optimum of Croatian interests and that this project needs to be unconditionally implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina together with the confederation with the Republic of Croatia. This is, after all, stipulated in the Washington Agreement.

[Kaurin] The deadline set in Bonn for carrying out certain assignments is already running out. How far have we gone with the implementation of the Bonn Agreement?

[Prlic] I would say that, as far as central Bosnia is concerned—the mixed canton, as it is called—everything is ready on the Croatian side. The political will exists, the technical details have been taken care of, and I do not expect any essential problems. The process is somewhat slower in the Neretva canton, where the situation is a little more turbulent. However, thanks to the talks we have just had in Zagreb, this project will also be completed in the shortest possible time.

Differences in Interpreting the Constitution

[Kaurin] There is talk of some sort of confederal tie between the Bosnian Serbs and the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Is there a chance that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina will agree to such a plan?

[Prlic] We believe that a parallel cannot be drawn between the confederation with the Republic of Croatia and the other one, as the circumstances are essentially different. The latter confederation involves only one nation, while two will form confederal ties with Croatia; moreover, on one side we have an aggressor, and on the other, people defending themselves. Several other legal and essential difference exist in connection with this.

The international community will find a model—it invariably does—for a final solution to the Bosnia-Herzegovina situation. We have to strive not to hinder the final solution, so as to make it as just as possible for all three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kaurin] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Republican Assembly is currently in session, and a session of the Constitution Assembly is in preparation. To what extent do the republican institutions hamper the work of the federal institutions?

[Prlic] There are different ways of interpreting the essence of the Constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The Croats have a different view of the Federation as a state of Croats and Bosniaks within the framework of a future organizational concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This concept has been clear for the past six months. However, it seems that the Muslim leadership is not ready to disclose this to its people. The concept envisages a union comprising 51 percent of territory for the Federation of the Bosniak and Croat peoples, while the remaining 49 percent are the Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We wish to go before the people with all the cards on the table. Personally, as far as my responsibility toward my people and other Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens is concerned, I do not wish to lead anyone into any kind of adventure.

Punish Both the Executors and Those Responsible

[Kaurin] Has there been any new information regarding the investigation into the murder of General Vlado Santic?

[Prlic] There are no new elements. We believe that the investigation is not progressing the way it should. We are asking the judiciary to conduct an official investigation to establish the objective responsibility and punish those who committed the crime and those who made it possible. We are talking about a Croatian Defense Council [HVO] general and the commander of the HVO General

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Staff, that part that was never a party to the conflict with the Muslims. Together they fought the aggression. You cannot dismiss the killing of a general as a simple incident. A general has a special status in any war. There is a tendency to water down the situation, which we shall not permit.

[Kaurin] If the case of Gen. Santic is not solved by next week, when the Constituent Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is scheduled to take place, is there a chance that the representatives of the Croatian people will not come to Sarajevo?

[Prlic] This does not mean that we shall not attend the session. This case will not lead us into the trap of not implementing what we agreed. We shall work on implementing what we agreed, but we shall also be decisive in insisting that this case is thoroughly investigated. I repeat, we shall demand the punishment of all those who are responsible for it.

Authority in Defense

[Kaurin] You are the defense minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Why do you hardly ever appear in public as the defense minister?

[Prlic] I have not appeared in public because from the very start I handed over the Defense Ministry to my deputy, which is why he is currently the exclusive authority for the Muslim armed component. I believe that it would be in poor taste and incompetent of me to be a minister. I am the prime minister of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosnia, which has the HVO, and I participated in the war with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. It would not do for me to be a minister.

I try, as much as possible, to contribute to the better organization, logistics, and all other elements of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. I have drafted the Defense Law and I believe it will now go through Assembly procedure. I can only be the Federation's defense minister once there is a legal basis for this. For the time being, I am just nominally the defense minister, but in practice, I am not.

[Kaurin] The cessation of hostilities agreement signed with the Serbs expires on 30 April. What will happen if Karadzic's Serbs do not accept the peace plan within the next month? Will the war continue?

[Prlic] As though the cease-fire were being observed now! Very intense battles are in progress in certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, much more intense than when there was no official cease-fire. There can be no lasting truce without a political solution. So far, the Contact Group plan has not been surpassed. There is nothing new and the optimal solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is along these lines.

[Kaurin] How far has the implementation of the agreement to appoint representatives of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina's diplomatic and consular missions worldwide progressed?

[Prlic] The Croats will submit appropriate proposals before the agreed deadline. We submitted a proposal to appoint Mile Akmadzic [former Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister] ambassador to the United States, but it was not implemented. Quite a few proposals have been submitted to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Interior Ministry, but none has been implemented. It is obvious that a certain balance must be reached in the area as well. The situation in which we currently have a Bosniak-Croat Federation, yet even Serbs outnumber Croats as ambassadors, is simply intolerable and inexplicable.

[Box, p 7]

Izetbegovic Wants the Bosniak Majority

[Kaurin] At the latest session of the Party of Democratic Action's Steering Committee, President Izetbegovic disclosed some of his stances. Do you consider this to be a return to the beginning?

[Prlic] One must always keep one thing in mind when it comes to Izetbegovic. He must clearly differentiate when he speaks as the leader of the Muslims and when he speaks as the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. We believe that he cannot be the president of the Presidency, either formally or legally. His mandate has expired. The Croatian people have objectively not given him the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the Croatian people. He can say whatever he wants in the name of the Bosniak people. Our stance in this respect is crystal clear and we are ready to defend it. Everywhere.

As for the stances that Mr. Izetbegovic expressed, the Croats are accused of not being in favor of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats are in favor of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not the kind that Alija Izetbegovic advocates. This means with a majority for one nation. This tendency is completely clear. We agree against this concept. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not only the state of the Bosniak people and the Bosniaks have to understand this. Once they understand it, we will have all the prerequisites for implementing the agreements that we have signed and prerequisites for new agreements that will enable the peaceful resolution of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and prosperity for the suffering people there and for those who were forced to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 7]

Equality: No More, No Less

[Kaurin] How would you comment on the secret negotiations between Sarajevo and Belgrade. Were the representatives of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina already aware of these negotiations?

[Prlic] No. None of the Croats was acquainted with this. My comment would be that this is not in the least bit

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amicable. If a single policy is being implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the Croats must participate in it because there is no constructive solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina without a solution to the Croatian issue. No one has the exclusive right to negotiate on behalf of the Croats. This is our stance and it is quite clear. Can you picture a situation in which a Croat from Bosnia-Herzegovina were to go and negotiate and the suspicion that would flood the Bosnia-Herzegovina public and the stories that would be circulated? We are an equal nation and we need to be equal formally and essentially. We do not ask for any more or less than this.

Fear of Territorial Trade Between Croats, Serbs

AU3103165295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 31 Mar 95

[Interview with Mehmed Dizdar, chairman of the State Cantonal Committee for the Implementation of the Federation in the Neretva Canton, by Suzana Djozo in Sarajevo on 31 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Djozo] Neretva's mixed Bosniak-Croatian canton includes the Neum, Capljina, Stolac, Mostar, Jablanica, Konjic, and Prozor municipalities. Work on the formation of the transitional bodies of authority is well behind schedule. As we are told by Mr. Mehmed Dizdar, chairman of the State Cantonal Committee for the Implementation of the Federation in the Neretva Canton, the difficulties are being caused by the Croatian side, and the initial problem in the negotiations between the representatives of the two federal partners was over the basic principle for the formation of transitional authorities.

[Dizdar] We insisted on the national census, while they insisted on the election results. That is where everything came to a standstill. The results achieved so far can be viewed from the present situation, as an arbitrator has been appointed to resolve disputed issues. We did not meet for very long simply because we [word indistinct] all the agreements, owing to the principle that was finally accepted, a principle that the Croats insisted on. We accepted this. We have done everything needed for the formation of municipal councils by 1 April. We finished that three or four days ago.

[Djozo] According to most predictions, the greatest problems in the formation of cantonal authorities will be in the Neretva Canton, particularly since crimes against Bosniaks were committed in parts of municipalities that are now under the control of the Croatian Defense Council, and since there are no more Bosniaks there. Tell us, what are the greatest problems and in which towns?

[Dizdar] In my view, the greatest problems are in Stolac and Capljina. The problems there are connected with the strategic interests of the Croats and the Croatian state. That is in the south of our canton and our country and it is also the very narrow belt leading to the coast. I think that the Croats' aim is to keep the Bosniaks as far away from the coast as they can and most of the trouble yet to come in the Federation will be there. I am afraid of one thing and I have had it on my mind for a while: Considering certain territorial trade-offs that have been going on so far, I am afraid of that territory in the south also being traded. It is possible that their reluctance to form this canton is in fact a sign that territorial trade-offs are in the offering. It is even possible that Stolac and the Dubravska heights might be given to the Serbs in a staged game.

[Djozo] Stressing that the constant delays and obstructions by the Croatian side are blocking the formation of the Neretva Canton, Mr. Mehmed Dizdar adds:

[Dizdar] As for our attitude toward the Federation, we really are in favor of the Federation. Our people are in favor of the Federation since it is in our interest and our people know it is in our interest. However, I am very sorry that the Croatian people in Herzegovina do not see it in that way and they want some kind of a state creation of their own. They had this during the last war, but as soon as the war was over that creation disappeared, and they have to be aware that the same will happen this time round. I think that Croatian policy, the policy of the state of Croatia, has to be conducted from the realization that the Federation is also in their very great interest.

West Bosnia 'Definitively' Splits From Sarajevo

LD0204114995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1048 GMT 2 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Drvar, April 2 (TANJUG)—Leader of west Bosnia Muslims Fikret Abdic said Sunday that west Bosnia has definitively seceded from the Sarajevo Muslim authorities, that is, from the 'Islamic current of Alija Izetbegovic.'

Abdic told the local Velkaton radio 'it is a question of days before the entire Bihac pocket would become an integral part of west Bosnia.' Velkaton radio reported that west Bosnia forces 'are liberating section by section' of the territory Abdic and his followers seceded in Oct. 1993 from the Sarajevo central Muslim government, opposing Izetbegovic's radical policies.

In an offensive last summer, Izetbegovic's forces managed to temporarily seize a larger portion of the west Bosnia territory. The Muslim population of west Bosnia at the time sought shelter in the neighboring republic of Serb [words indistinct] After several months, the forces of west Bosnia undertook an offensive aimed at expelling the Sarajevo Muslim Government forces. Heavy inter-Muslim fighting continues since.

UN: Aid Convoys Allowed To Enter Sarajevo

AU3103165995 Paris AFP in English 1626 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 31 (AFP)—Aid convoys started rolling into Sarajevo Friday [31

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March] after a week-long stoppage due to a dispute between the warring parties over the use of respective checkpoints into the city, a UN spokesman said here.

Kris Janowski, from the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), said the Bosnian Government reopened a checkpoint at Rajlovac, in the west of town, allowing a UNHCR convoy of 60 tons of food to enter Serb-held territory in the morning. Bosnian Serbs then reopened their own checkpoint, at "Sierra 4" between the airport and the city, allowing a convoy with 150 tons of food to enter the besieged capital. More than 1,000 tons of food and other emergency aid had been stranded on the taxiway of Sarajevo airport after the dispute sprung up last weekend.

On Thursday, the humanitarian air bridge into the city was scaled down to 40 percent of normal capacity because of the backlog. The closure of the Serb checkpoint had also affected aid convoys bringing food overland into the city.

The Bosnian Government had originally demanded that the UNHCR use other routes to supply the Serbs than the Rajlovac checkpoint, west of the city. Some 33 percent of all humanitarian aid delivered to Sarajevo goes to Serb-held areas.

Report Views Filipovic-Milosevic Meeting

AU0304111495 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 24 Mar 95 p 5

[S. Luckin report: "A Meeting of Certain Hope"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news about the meeting between President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic and ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Switzerland Muhamed Filipovic in Belgrade on Tuesday, that was first published by the London FINANCIAL TIMES, was confirmed late Thursday by the Cabinet of Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Before this official confirmation the sources that OSLOBODJENJE turned to for details were not able to confirm the news, but nor did they deny it. OSLOBODJENJE also tried to contact Filipovic at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Bern, where we were told that Ambassador Filipovic was presently on a business trip to the Netherlands.

Now, when the news on the meeting between Milosevic and Filipovic in Belgrade is confirmed, that very fact could be taken as a significant turn in the settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We draw such a conclusion chiefly from the fact that Milosevic was ready to take part at such a meeting far from the public eye, thereby recognizing in a certain way the legality of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its official authorities.

Milosevic Is Yielding Under Pressure

This is to say, strings are still being pulled through secret diplomatic channels, which is understandable, but even such a meeting of one official of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities with the so far incontestable leader of Serbia indicates that Milosevic is yielding under the pressure put on him by the international community, and that now he is only looking for a way to justify to his own people his withholding of support for Karadzic and his followers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

There are several signals indicating this. At a much higher level, just several days ago, at the meeting between Juppe and Christopher it was implied that the sanctions against Serbia may be lifted if it shows a will to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina. It can be believed that the proposal made by the chief of the French diplomatic corps, which was also endorsed by his American colleague, is based on certain signals coming precisely from Belgrade.

The very selection of Filipovic is also indicative.

Let us recall: Shortly before the war, he, together with Adil Zulfikarpasic, was one of the coauthors of the historic Muslim-Serbian Agreement. It can be supposed that he has rather good relations with certain circles in Belgrade dating from that time, and that for that reason Milosevic may more easily accept him as a potential negotiator.

Another fact is important in analyzing the background of this meeting. Objectively seen, the continuation of the war, given the current balance of power, suits Radovan Karadzic the most. His "state" can exist only as long as the war goes on, because it secures him the support of Serbia. In any additional conflict, in view of the strong nationalist feeling of the Serbian people, shaped through the attitudes of official policy in recent years, few people would dare withhold help to Karadzic. Not even Milosevic is that strong.

If he wants to avoid the continuation of the war and the further decline of Serbia in international relations, that is, its total isolation, Milosevic must look for new allies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The attempts to break Karadzic through a group of independent assembly deputies in the Pale parliament have obviously failed, and it has turned out that the leader from Pale is too strong for Belgrade to do away with him directly.

Condition—Recognition

This breach certainly represents a chance for Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, the attitude of official Sarajevo is quite clear—negotiations with Belgrade are possible only after mutual recognition. Izetbegovic has suggested that after 30 April Bosnia-Herzegovina will not launch any greater offensives, but it will not extend the current cease-fire and situation that may drag on endlessly.

Several weeks ago one of the officials of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], Safet Halilovic, who is the chairman of this party's Sarajevo branch, pointed to the diplomatic initiative in Belgrade precisely as a possible

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direction for further activities in the search for a peace solution. True, he also underlined that the condition for that is mutual recognition.

In all this the greatest secret is in what way the contacts between Sarajevo and Belgrade could be established, the final results of which would be the end of the war. Well-informed circles mention as one possibility the Serbian Civil Council [SGV], a nonpartisan organization that supports integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. One attempt made by a delegation of this association to visit Belgrade has already failed. These days a new delegation of SGV has set off to Belgrade. If they reach their destination, it is possible that there they will accomplish more than mere informing of the local public on the truth about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Besides, the SGV has expressed its desire to get involved in the international negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, certain international diplomatic circles are ready to support this demand of SGV. Of course, Milosevic is aware of all this as well.

In recent days support by Milosevic and the Socialist Party of Serbia for a peaceful policy has been apparent in the Belgrade media, particularly on the TV and radio, and this could be an additional confirmation of the Belgrade regime's efforts aimed at creating a climate in which a possible recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia would be possible.

[Box, p 5]

Sarajevo, 23 March (BH PRESS)—Following the news about the meeting between the Ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Switzerland, Muhamed Filipovic, and President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic, BH PRESS has asked the Cabinet of the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to confirm the news.

We have learnt that Ambassador Filipovic, following the instructions of President Izetbegovic, met with Milosevic. The goal of this visit was for the Bosnian side to obtain direct, first-hand information on the real intentions of Serbia and Milosevic regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the same time to inform Mr. Milosevic that no kind of political settlement that is not based on the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina is acceptable.

After he returned from Belgrade the ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Switzerland, Muhamed Filipovic, has stated that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is interested in the immediate recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first place, while it is of secondary importance whether that recognition is made by Milosevic or [President] Lilic.

The Deutche Welle radio reports that the direct contacts between Sarajevo and Belgrade were initiated at the meeting of the foreign ministers of Greece, Iran and Bosnia-Herzegovina, held in Athens early in March.

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Granic: Vance Plan Not Basis of UN Resolution

LD0104113995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 1 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, told a news conference today that the UN Security Council resolution on renewing the UN forces' mandate in Croatia is the most powerful political document that the Security Council has ever passed in the interest of the Republic of Croatia. Vera Tomasek has a report.

[Tomasek] Resolution 981 reflects the spirit of the Copenhagen Agreement, the talks President Tudjman held in Washington and New York, and the conclusions of the Croatian assembly, Granic said.

[Begin Granic recording] There is no more UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]. UNPROFOR's mandate in the Republic of Croatia has ended. There are no more UN Protected Areas, no more Yugoslavia in the resolution. This is the peace forces' new mandate in the Republic of Croatia. The resolution strongly reaffirms the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia. It also introduces the mechanisms for controlling the borders of the Republic of Croatia.

The Vance plan is no longer the basis of the resolution; only certain important elements from the Vance plan have been retained, such as the return of refugees and demilitarization. The resolution also introduces some new elements, such as the cease-fire agreement and the economic agreement, and everything points to the process of a peaceful reintegration. The resolution calls on Belgrade to recognize Croatia within its internationally recognized borders, and advises Knin to resume the talks on political issues and the peaceful reintegration. [end recording]

[Tomasek] This political resolution will be followed by intensive negotiations with the UN secretary general over the next few weeks, as well as with his envoys. The secretary general will then put forward a proposal for an operational resolution, Mate Granic said, among other things.

Babic Rejects 'Essential Change' in UN Mandate

AU3103165095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 31 Mar 95 p 3

[FoNet-attributed report: "Krajina Is Not Part of Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin—Milan Babic, Krajina foreign minister, has stated specially for FoNet that the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] finds unacceptable any essential change in the mandate of the UN peacekeepers as proposed in the Security Council's new draft resolution, such as the blockade of the borders of the RSK and the hints at a political solution within Croatia.

"The government of the RSK today held an urgent session and the UN draft resolution on the peacekeepers' deployment in Krajina as proposed by the Contact Group was on the agenda," Babic said.

"We received that resolution from New York and we said that the present mandate of the UN peacekeepers in the RSK has been the optimal mandate, which strengthened peace and enabled the cease-fire last year and several peace arrangements, all with the aim of achieving a final political solution to the crisis in the entire Yugoslavia, that is, in the RSK and Croatia," he explained.

"The RSK is not a part of Croatia, and no arrangement that would enable any kind of military formations, including those of the United Nations, to act upon any other principle will be accepted in the RSK, and they will be prevented from realizing those principles," he concluded.

RSK Rejects New Mandate; Zagreb 'Satisfied'

AU0104140695 Paris AFP in English 1326 GMT 1 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, April 1 (AFP)—Leaders of Croatian Serb [republic of Serbian Krajina—RSK] separatists Saturday [1 April] dismissed a new UN mandate for Croatia as "unacceptable," but the Croatian authorities in Zagreb said they were satisfied with the terms of the deal.

The UN Security Council voted through the mandate after lengthy talks over the issue of whether the name Croatia should be included in the name of the new force. In the end, the name—the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO)—was agreed, winning the backing of Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic who said the name "re-asserted the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia."

However, Pero Damjanic, spokesman for the self-proclaimed Serb Republic of Krajina [RSK], the eastern region of Croatia held by separatist Serbs, told AFP that Croatian Serb opposition to the wording was undiminished. Asked if the mandate of the new force was unacceptable, he replied: "Obviously." The wording had taken on a special meaning for Croatia in its diplomatic battle with secessionist Serbs who control about a quarter of Croatian territory.

Relative peace has been maintained in Croatia for the past year, monitored by the 15,000-strong UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) whose mandate ran out at midnight on Friday. UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and UN peacekeeping officials had warned that a withdrawal would likely mean also having to pull out of the neighbouring Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Granic, calling on Belgrade to recognise Croatia, told Croatian radio: "This is the strongest political statement

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by the Security Council on Croatia. There is no more UNPROFOR mandate, no more UNPA (Croatian zones controlled by secessionist Serbs and placed under UN control) and the word Yugoslavia is not there," he added.

"It is a new mandate for peacekeeping forces in Croatia," he said, adding that it included "new elements on controlling the (Croatian-Serb) ceasefire and the economic accord" between Zagreb and authorities in Krajina. Granic said the mandate "will help toward a peaceful reintegration of Croatian territory occupied by Serbs" and provide a start towards "political talks" with regional Serb leaders.

Under the new mandate, the UN force in Croatia will be limited to monitoring movement of men and military equipment across Croatia's borders with Serb-held Bosnian territory and Serbia, but not allowed to intervene.

Mandates for the UN missions in the other former Yugoslav republics were expected to remain virtually unaltered, except for a name change in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], where the UN mission would be renamed "UN Preventive Deployment Force".

RSK Local Committee Opposes UN Resolution

LD0204144195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1346 GMT 2 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 2 Apr (SRNA)—The Benkovac municipal committee of the Serb Democratic Party of Serb Lands [SDS SZ—Srpska demokratska stranka srpskih zemalja] stressed in a statement issued today that if the new name for UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] is accepted, the Serb people in the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] will cease to be a political entity and will become an object of the self-will and savagery of neofascist Croatia.

"Now, when the new UN resolution has annulled the Vance plan, we can make the only logical and natural move—unite the Srpska republic and the RSK. We expect our leaderships immediately to implement the formal unification in line with the people's wish," the statement stresses.

Expressing the belief that the name UNCRO [United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] annuls the existence of the RSK, members of the SDS Benkovac municipal committee rejected the possibility of the deployment of observers [posmatraci], and especially the deployment of soldiers of the new UN forces on the border with the Srpska republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

"World powers, whose will is expressed through compromised organizations such as the United Nations, do not care for the fact that the RSK has never in its history been part of Croatia and is not part of it today, either. Such arrogant cynicism is probably unprecedented in history," the statement stresses and suggests that cooperation with the United Nations be cancelled, as RSK President Milan Martic has demanded on several occasions.

The SDS Benkovac municipal committee expressed unconditional support for the stances of the state leaderships of the Srpska republic and the RSK on the indivisibility of the Serb people and the joint defense of the historic Serb territories.

RSK Commander Claims Dinara Under Serb Control

AU3103193495 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] With the implementation of the cease-fire agreement between the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] and Croatia of 29 March last year the number of tragic incidents has greatly decreased on both sides. However, since the beginning of the Croatian campaign concerning the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate, the Croatian Army has been violating the agreement, said Lieutenant General Milan Celeketic.

According to him, in some of the theaters of operation of some of the brigades of the Serb army of Krajina, the Croatian Army has been moving their troops, and at times entered the separation zone between the RSK and the Republic of Croatia. However, we are doing the same in order to prevent possible aggressive intentions of the Croatian Army, continued the commander of the Serb army of Krajina.

Gen. Celeketic also said that there was a great deal of misinformation and arbitrary interpretation of the situation in the separation zone. There have been claims that the Serb army of Krajina has been pulling out of some of the front areas at Dinara, which is not true. The Serb army of Krajina has the area under control, and the situation there is stabilized, categorically claimed Gen. Celeketic.

Army Chief Bobetko Comments on Talks in Bosnia

LD0104133195 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2130 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Unidentified announcer] Our guest in this evening's Picture Versus Picture program is General Janko Bobetko, the Croatian Army Chief of the General Staff. Mr. Bobetko, good evening and welcome.

[Bobetko] Good Evening.

[Announcer] You have returned from Bosnia-Herzegovina; we have prepared a video report to go with this interview; we hope that the report will show what was happening there, which will show all those dramatic events, and which will show talks and meetings in

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Bosnia. Political relations between Croats and Muslim-Bosniaks, and because of the military situation on the ground, your first meetings with the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] generals and commanders in Zagreb and these meetings in Bosnia-Herzegovina are especially interesting. First of all, how was the Croatian Army chief of the general staff greeted in Bosnia?

[Bobetko] You know, ordinary people say and conclude that everything was all right, but I can say with clear conscience that I was accorded a pleasant, even friendly reception, and that the entire atmosphere—which normally was around me and with me—imposed a fundamental imperative that it is possible to reach an agreement provided that you are consistent in implementing your joint conclusions, and that you are painstakingly and gradually moving toward the implementation of what is realistic and beneficial.

I said during our first meeting in Zagreb that no one has ever resolved all the problems at once, but that it is very important first to establish a relationship and then proceed from those issues which, whether we like it or not, are crucial for both nations. [Video report shows Bobetko in talks with Bosnian Government Army generals in Travnik]

[Announcer] Here is a report on your meetings and talks in Travnik. Did you discuss in your talks, and especially with Gen. Rasim Delic, a military alliance between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is, which are peacetime and which are possible joint military objectives [as heard]?

[Bobetko] You know, the meeting was not convened with the aim of drawing up operational plans and some tasks which would then be made operational. The talks discussed issues on which a possible, realistic, and objective plan of how to ensure the safety of both nations living together in a greater or smaller area could be created.

This is one of the fundamental questions: Whether conditions have been created for Muslims to feel safe in areas where Croats are in the majority, that all human rights are respected, that talks leading to solutions have been started, and vice versa.

The second issue, from the military viewpoint, is that both nations have lost territories to the same aggressor which, according to international standards and decision, are seen as occupied territories. Both countries are sovereign and are internationally recognized. Hence, it is in the final analysis in the interest of the people to return to their homes, that human obligations are, although not granted to them, they are fulfilled.

I ask you what kind of military commanders or people serving their people would not take this into account? What would their agreement then be based on?

[Announcer] What is the situation on the ground, which you saw because you were in a position to see what the situation on the ground is; for instance, on whether the HVO will join with and liberate Croatian areas which are still under occupation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bobetko] Listen, objectively speaking, it is a well organized army. For instance, I was in Travnik because I was interested in the Vlasic operation. Mt. Vlasic is a strategic point from which the entire River Lasva valley can be shelled, and from which Travnik can be controlled [kontrolira]. Hence, it impacts on political and other aspects. The capture of Mt. Vlasic shows that this is a well organized army which has incorporated basic principles. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] I suggest that we hear a statement given by Gen. Rasim Delic.

[Begin Delic recording] I can conclude that we have both the desire and readiness to deploy forces belonging to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Croat Defense Forces, and the Croatian Army against a common, Serb-Montenegrin aggressor.

We have reached an agreement on several specific issues; among other things, about our joint operations. That is, a draft on joint engagement of special purpose industries, which—by complementing each other—could provide better logistical support for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the HVO, and the Croatian Army. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Announcer] I would like to ask you once more, how do you see the fundamental problem when it comes to the Federation of Muslims and Croats-Bosniaks? You were there, you talked to the people. Which, in your view, is the step which has to be made for things to become finally clearer, better, and better organized?

[Bobetko] There are so many questions. But the fundamental thing is to create trust. We should start from small and realistic steps, which would than pave the way. If the Washington Agreement is a solution—and it is a solution, through which the international policy is giving a chance to and supporting such a step—then there are areas which should be studied that are not just the stuff of dreams but of effort. [passage omitted]

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Transport Protocol Held Back By Language Dispute

AU0304092895 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 30 Mar 95

[Report by Ivan Mokrov, containing statement by Boris Tusevski, FYROM deputy minister of Transportation and Communications; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bulgarian and Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] transportation experts have been discussing goods traffic for two days, but no protocol has been signed because of the familiar issue of the use of the Macedonian language. However, the Bulgarian representatives have promised to be flexible and largely liberalize the movement of our transportation firms' shipments.

[Tusevski] No protocol was signed after the meeting because the Bulgarian expert group had been instructed to follow the policy of the Bulgarian side and was not authorized to make any concessions. The Macedonian side—that is we here, for our part—insisted that documents agreed on with foreign countries should be signed in both languages—that is, Macedonian and the language of the other country to the agreement. These issues go beyond the competence of expert discussions. [passage omitted]

Germany To Grant Aid for Railroad Link

LD0104172195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1601 GMT 1 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 1 Apr (TANJUG)—According to a statement issued today, the German Government is prepared to grant 5 million Deutsch marks in aid to The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] for the construction of a railway linking it with neighboring Bulgaria.

FYROM Transport Minister Dimitar Buzlevski spoke about the realization of the aid with the German Ambassador in Skopje, Lothar Stepan, on Friday. [passage omitted]

The initial cost of the project, set at $120 million, has been revised, and now it is stressed that $200 million will be needed to complete the work.

Crvenkovski Urges Butrus-Ghali To Alter Report

AU0304082495 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Reacting to the UN secretary general's latest report on the situation in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], on 27 March Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski sent a letter to Butrus Butrus-Ghali containing a number of concrete suggestions. Macedonian sources are saying that the majority of these have been incorporated into the latest draft of the report to be submitted today to the UN Security Council.

Among these suggestions our ministry said that the elections in the Republic of Macedonia, in spite of some technical errors, should be assessed as fair and democratic, and it should be pointed out that the boycott of two opposition parties occurred in the second round of the elections as a result of the defeat that they suffered in the first. Following these elections, a legitimate government was formed in Macedonia that included four of the seven parties represented in parliament. The census in Macedonia was legal and took place under international supervision. That is why the political comment on the census is seen as irrelevant. This was stated in Crvenkovski's letter reacting to the report's conclusion that Albanian party leaders reject the census results.

Another demand was to revise the description of the Greek trade embargo to make it read "an illegal trade embargo unilaterally imposed by Greece." This change was suggested in the spirit of Resolution 817 and associated UN Security Council documents. It was also indicated that in UN and EU documents the internal borders of the former Yugoslav republics are accepted as international borders. The problem is in the demarcation of the border, and Macedonia has proposed the formation of a bilateral state commission. That was also mentioned in Crvenkovski's letter to Butrus Butrus-Ghali in response to his report.

What was the Macedonian side able to do to change the secretary general's report? Butrus Butrus-Ghali's report to the UN Security Council on Macedonia—whether subjective, realistic, or unrealistic, is a document that, once adopted, imposes obligations upon states. Angele Busevski has a commentary from the studio entitled: As You Like It.

[Begin recording] In the report on Macedonia that Butrus-Ghali sent to the world organization with the aim of describing the internal situation, you can read about everybody and everything. The internal political and economic situation, Macedonia and its international surroundings, as well as all possible developments, are contained in it, and the text satisfies the criteria of a general exposition of the facts. We cannot object to the conclusion that the situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is being affected by complex foreign and internal factors that contribute to economic and political insecurity, as well as to the growing social tensions in the country. We do not wish here to quote similar conclusions. But actually, one can be subjective in reading and interpreting the text. Some of the conclusions in the secretary general's report to the UN Security Council can be interpreted in many ways. It seems that they were guided by different interests, policies, and perhaps powerful sponsors, such as the part that casts aspersions on the international census observers. Although the international observers approved the

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census as being accurate and regular, the ethnic Albanian leaders refuse to accept the results. Mr. Butrus-Ghali, having been inconsistent and having made interpretations and empty offers from the very outset of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, is now exposing his own emissaries and mediators to political and ethical doubt, and is minimizing their findings by expressing such doubt. Speaking of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and their leaders, Mr. Butrus-Ghali even elevates them to negotiating partners with the Macedonian Government, thereby creating the impression that in Macedonia there are two governments negotiating over problems. This argument is proffered and found in our day-to-day politics. The international community insists on recognizing interrepublican borders as international, while the secretary general's report treats them as administrative. The Macedonian-Serbian border is an international border and the Macedonian initiative for its demarcation has so far been ignored by our northern neighbor. We believe that Butrus-Ghali is aware of this because the peacemakers deployed on the border arrived there upon his authorization. Can the top man in the world organization doubt the legality of our parliament and president, after his informants assured him that the elections were regular and peaceful?

In practice, Butrus-Ghali, who was expected to present an objective report, is here offering an alternative descriptive containing material adapted to the current political moment that can basically be used in many ways and can suit the needs of a wider circle of political subjects both in Macedonia and in the world at large. We can find evidence of this in the current political instability in the region, the future transformation of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], the Graeco-Macedonian situation, and probably the influence and the interest of the United States. We must admit that our diplomats in the world organization have played a role in the preparation of the report, because it must be informed about the process and contents of a report by the UN secretary general. Nevertheless, at least there are some responses now, while there are still some chances for corrections.

In brief, the report as a document has already been presented to the 15 members of the UN Security Council; its implementation will follow its official adoption; and it will be transformed into a set of obligations. Its subjectivity will then be forgotten and it will be an accepted act that has to be applied. [end recording]

Charges Filed Against Albanian Rector, Activist

AU0204170095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 1 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Tetovo Prosecution Office yesterday filed charges against Tetovo University rector Dr. Fadil Sulejmani for the criminal act of calling for resistance, which envisages prison terms from one to five years. The charge states that Dr. Fadil Sulejmani has repeatedly appealed to the Albanian population in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] for resistance, despite the conclusions and decisions by the Macedonian Government regarding [word indistinct] the University of Tetovo.

Reports confirm that charges were also filed against Milaim Fejziu, chairman of the Gostivar-based Forum for Human Rights. Fejziu is charged with participating in a demonstration and preventing official authorities from carrying out their jobs.

The prosecutor has appealed to the Tetovo Commune Court to continue to hold Dr. Fadil Sulejmani and Milaim Fejziu in custody until the court issues its decision.

These two activists have been detained twice by the Tetovo Court for 30 days.

Ethnic Turk Leader: 'Second-Class Citizens'

AU3103172695 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 30 Mar 95 p 8

[Interview with Erdogan Sarac, leader of the Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia, by M. Jovanovski; place and date not given: "National Hatred—The Greatest Enemy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Turks in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM] are dissatisfied and have complaints on their constitutional position and educational status within the system. Erdogan Sarac, president of the Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia, indicates these as the most current problems and says that the Macedonian Constitution defines the Turks in Macedonia as second-class citizens. In his opinion, they are far from enjoying their constitutional rights in the sphere of education.

[Jovanovski] Does your party refuse to accept that the Turks in Macedonia are a nationality [smaller than a "nation," larger than a "minority"] and therefore feel that their rights are restricted, or do you feel deprived of your rights as a nationality?

[Sarac] We do not suffer from a complex over what some might call us: A nationality, nation, or minority. Whatever we are called, we are a part of the great Turkish world nation. States can have borders; nations cannot. It is impossible, particularly in the Balkans, to restrict a nation within borders. That is why the thesis of one nation-one people is impossible and leads to certain bloodshed. We are against this, but the truth is that the Balkans, and Macedonia as its integral part, represent a mosaic of many nations, or you can say nationalities. Now, looking back, the 1974 Constitution defines us as a constituent element of the state. Toward the end of the 1980s there were changes in the Constitution making us practically second-class citizens, which has also been incorporated into the new Macedonian Constitution.

Second-Class Citizens

[Jovanovski] In what parts of the system do you feel that the Turks in Macedonia are second-class citizens?

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[Sarac] Well, we say that the Constitution is civic, but there is an Article, number 48, which says that the nationalities have the right to education in their mother tongue at elementary and high schools.

[Jovanovski] As the party of Turks, you have frequently emphasized rights to education. It would be sufficient if we pointed out the example of Zupa. Can you tell us the reasons for your discontent in education?

[Sarac] In eastern Macedonia, for instance, there is not a single class in Turkish from the fifth to the eighth grade—and not only this, but the level of education is very bad. I tell you that because there is no possibility of education in their mother tongue, there are about 1,000 Turks in this region who do not attend these levels of education. Our demands are not anti-constitutional, but we want reforms to promote education for Turks. If Macedonia is a rule-of-law state, it must create conditions for education of Turks in their mother tongue. We shall be forced to doubt that the proclaimed wish and need for the integration of Turks into the system is real.

[Jovanovski] How do you explain that you insist on education in Turkish in Zupa when the population there—that is the pupils—do not speak Turkish?

[Sarac] I shall give you an example in Ohrid. There are 42 pupils in the first grade who do not speak Macedonian at all, and they are educated in Macedonian. But we do not oppose this, because it is their own wish, as well as that of their parents. We are against cases where the wish of the citizens is clear but not respected. In the village of Selce (Stip) we have 39 pupils who study in Macedonian and speak Macedonian at home, and in our opinion this is a factory for "producing" Macedonian Muslims. We, as a party, respect the wishes of the citizens, but the regime should do likewise. We know that in Macedonia, pressure is exerted when decisions about national affiliation are made, although this right is guaranteed by the Constitution. One section of citizens who declare themselves Turks does not have the opportunity of being educated in their mother tongue and developing Turkish culture.

Respect of Rights

[Jovanovski] You say that the educational rights of Turks in Macedonia are endangered. However, there are opposite claims that are backed by the example of the Turkish class in the J.B. Tito High School in Skopje. There were additional open competitions for places in this class because the candidates could not pass the entrance examination.

[Sarac] That is correct. But there was a different situation in Gostivar, where 48 students passed the examination and there is a possibility of forming not one, but two classes in Turkish. The violations of rights in education result in the migration of Turks from Macedonia, and this is not to the state's advantage because the Turks in Macedonia have always been a stabilizing factor.

[Jovanovski] You talk about the constitutional position of the Turks as a problem but then stress the presence of your nationality in the educational system. Are there any other political issues that you are not satisfied with?

[Sarac] We are not at all satisfied with the electoral law, because it does not let us integrate into the system. We were the last to form a national party in Macedonia. We originally had an alliance that included all our citizens, with their ideas and contributions to party life in Macedonia. Nevertheless, when we realized that all the parties were acting in a nationalistic way, we formed a party to obtain our civil rights. I think that our activities as a party are very positive, because we act in accordance with the Constitution and so far we have not done anything to damage relations. The most important thing for us is to prevent national hatred, because that is the greatest enemy.

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Federal

Minister Denies Persecution of Muslims in Sandzak

LD3103180295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1456 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 31 Mar (TANJUG)—A call by the Muslim parliament of former Bosnia-Herzegovina to the European Union [EU] and to the United Nations to protect the human rights of Muslims living in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is yet another attempt by Alija Izetbegovic to set new conditions for the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia, Federal Minister Margit Savovic told TANJUG today.

Two days ago, the parliament of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina called on the EU and Uninted Nations to protect the human rights of Muslims living in Yugoslavia, particularly in Sandzak, REUTER reported. [passage omitted]

"The call for the protection of Muslims in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and accusations against our country in this respect have come at a time of intensified activities by the Muslim Army formations in former Bosnia-Herzegovina," Savovic said. She said that their aim is to divert the attention of the world public from the obvious violation of the four-month cease-fire and at the same time an attempt to "manipulate the public by telling lies according to a well-tested scenario."

"The Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are accused, among other things, of expelling over 70,000 so-called Bosniaks from the territory of Raska. The accusation also mentions some Serbian province of Sandzak which, as such, does not exist in the territorial organization of the Republic of Serbia," Savovic said.

On several occasions the public has been reminded of the fact that Sandzak was a Turkish name for an administrative unit, the kind which existed in the Ottoman Empire in great numbers, she explained. Commenting on Silajdzic's claims of mass expulsions of Muslims from Serbia since the war broke out in former Yugoslavia, Savovic said that these figures, too, have been manipulated.

Quite a number of them actively participated in battles on the side of the Muslim forces in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many were killed and today the Muslims are trying to present them as the victims of some kind of a torture by the Serbian authorities," she said. Savovic added that the others, as well as many citizens of Serbian or Montenegrin nationality, have been touring the world in search of a job or bare existence, as a result of the international economic blockade and poverty in general."

"The accusation that the authorities are denying the people their right to their own language, cultural institutions, and history are unfounded," Savovic says because everyone living in the Raska area has the same culture and language and common and indivisible history."

"The words 'Bosniak' and 'Bosniak language' are being used since Alija Izetbegovic came to power," she recalled. According to her, the claim that all Muslim political activists are being persecuted is not true. "No one is being charged just because of his political activities, but only because of committing certain criminal acts, as proven in legal proceedings," she added.

"Here I have in mind primarily Sulejman Ugljanin—a warrant for his arrest has been issued, because he is outside the country—and who, with some others, was selling arms illegally and setting up para-police units in order to ensure the successful and violent secession," Savovic specified.

Serbia

Seselj: Milosevic To Recognize Bosnia, Croatia

AU3103164295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 31 Mar 95 p 4

[Report by M. Mikuljanac: "Seselj: Milosevic Is Disbanding Both Assemblies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"Slobodan Milosevic has definitely decided to recognize Bosnia and Croatia within their AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders and now he is only deciding on the series of moves to do so," Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, said at a news conference yesterday.

Seselj predicts that, before recognizing Bosnia and Croatia, Milosevic will first disband both assemblies (the Republic and the Federal one) so as to avoid having the two assemblies debate the issue.

The Radicals believe that the Serbian president is looking for people to "verify" the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics with their signatures. They expect that this will be done by Federal officials Zoran Lilic, Radoje Kontic, and Vladislav Jovanovic, so he can therefore conceal his role in the business.

"He cannot fool us like that since we know who issues orders, who carries them out, and who is behind such a treacherous policy," Seselj concluded.

Commenting on the debate on the work of the Serbian Government in the Assembly, Seselj said that Mirko Marjanovic's cabinet was "incompetent." "The fact that the government is saying only the best about itself—as people normally do about someone who has just died—best illustrates that its time is nigh. There will soon be a change in the government and the Assembly may be disbanded," Seselj added.

The Radicals will continue to hold rallies throughout Serbia. The next ones will be in Cacak and Loznica and they are also planning a great rally in Belgrade.

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SPS's Percevic Views Relations With Pale

AU3103140095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Mar 95 p 8

[Interview with SPS Deputy Chairman Goran Percevic by Aleksandra Miketa: "We Have Retained the Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Immediately before the Yugoslav delegation went to Spain to participate in the interparliamentary union we talked to Goran Percevic, deputy chairman of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], about the possible lifting of the sanctions, the SPS's peace policy, recognition of Croatia, and the latest cooperation among the opposition parties. [passage omitted]

[Miketa] How would you define the present relations between the Srpska republic [RS] leadership and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]?

[Percevic] There has arisen an interruption in political relations between the leadership of the RS and the FRY because RS's decision to reject the Contact Group plan was, in our opinion, against the interests of the Serbian nation in general. A distinction must be made, however, between our relations with the RS leadership and the Serbian people in the RS. If we speak about the people, it is doubtless that we permanently help them; there is solidarity with them, which is also proven by the fact that the people in the RS have succeeded in defending and liberating themselves. They have also been successful in organizing their political life, so that they have become a state to the extent that they can now, with our support, negotiate and decide about their destiny themselves. Relations with the people, therefore, mean help and solidarity, and relations with the RS leadership are something completely different. These were interrupted when the RS leadership made moves that harmed the people in the RS, the FRY, and the Serbian nation in general.

[Miketa] Can people understand these sudden changes in politics? You must know that there are many people who misinterpret the interruption of relations between the two Serbian leaderships as an interruption of relations within our nation.

[Percevic] We are still helping the people in the RS. I do not agree with those who think that it meant a turnaround in the policy of the FRY, and Serbia first of all, toward the RS. Our policy has from the beginning been a policy that has supported a peaceful solution and equal treatment for all the nations on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now that the main aims of the just struggle of the Serbian people for freedom, equality, and a national state have been achieved, when the Serbs have been guaranteed a state, a parliament, and a government, when its right to merge with the home country has been internationally legitimized, when the time has come to authorize internationally the results of that just struggle, everything is being put at stake through irrational moves by the Pale leadership. What we referred to last summer are becoming clear today, but there have been many victims, and we are again in the position that we had at the beginning. A peace plan was offered as a basis, which the RS leadership also considered 80 percent acceptable. If something is 80 percent acceptable, it is completely irrational to refuse it as a basis for further negotiations. If the plan had been accepted, further suffering of the Serbian people would have been prevented and it would have been possible to recognize internationally the results of the bitter struggle.

[Miketa] Is it realistic to expect a new election in the RS? Can it be expected that this election will bring about a change?

[Percevic] It is a fact that all the bodies on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina were elected in 1990 and that their mandates have expired, which means that they are now illegally holding office. Take, for example, Alija Izetbegovic, who still presents himself as the president of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, although he does not have this mandate. It is necessary to constitute political bodies in these territories in a democratic way. An election must be carried out in the RS, so that the highest political bodies can be constituted in a democratic way. The RS is in a situation that cannot be considered a normal setting for elections but also under these exceptional circumstances it must be possible to elect political bodies that will decide on the destiny of the people in a democratic way.

[Miketa] It is clear now that the UN forces will be staying in the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], but a change of their mandate has been considered—it is possible that the Serbs will be divided. Will the FRY allow this?

[Percevic] It is important to mention that Croatia's decision to remove the UN Protection Force was a dangerous threat to peace, not only on the territory of former Croatia, but throughout the Balkans. The fact that the UN forces will remain is proof that the chances of preventing war are good. It is important that the UN mission remains a peacekeeping mission, because the maintenance of peace is a prerequisite for the second stage, in which economic relations and the infrastructure should start functioning. These negotiations are already under way and they are developing in a positive way. All this together creates an atmosphere that is a prerequisite for a final political solution. The final solution should be sought in direct negotiations between Zagreb and Knin and any solution reached through an agreement will be acceptable for the FRY.

I believe that the UN forces will keep their peacekeeping mission. Any decision that would militate toward the UN forces remaining a factor of peace and prevent a war from breaking out between the RSK and Croatia is a proper decision and I sincerely hope that they will retain this function. Everything else is a matter of speculation and hypothetical that I would not like to discuss. We shall wait for the decision of the Bosnian Serbs in order to define our attitude; we do not want to make any speculations now.

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[Miketa] Are you afraid of the increasingly good cooperation amomg the opposition parties and of the possibility that all the opposition leaders might appear together with Radovan Karadzic at the next election?

[Percevic] I think that the cooperation between opposition parties is their internal matter. They have acted together in previous elections, too. The fact that parties with such different programs form associations confirms how inconsistent they are. If those who used to call one another names such as "fascists" and "traitors" and who heavily opposed each other are acting together now, it is obvious that the reason for it is their intention to seize power for its own sake and not for the sake of the implementation of their programs, because their programs are so different that they could not be merged into a joint one.

[Box, p 8]

A Flagrant Lie

[Miketa] You know what a large part of the opposition thinks. They say that it was the SPS that started the war, which now claims that it is leading a policy of peace. Something similar may be said of the opposition. Whose policy is consistent?

[Percevic] Those who claim that the SPS started the war are telling a flagrant lie and are working directly against the interests of their own country, because they are offering a false alibi to those who introduced the unjust sanctions against our country, who claim that the sanctions against the FRY were introduced because of alleged aggression. These statements have made them the most extremist forces in the international community, who have a biased, anti-Serb, and hostile attitude toward our country. They should reconsider their statements. Those who lead the policy of capitulation and have been ready to sell out their own people before are now trying to present our option as the war option, which is a lie. Peace has been maintained in Serbia, although the country has gone through considerable changes regarding its national structure, whereas in the former republics in which nationalism and secessionism won, it came to national conflicts and war. I think that these are obvious facts that cannot be denied by any intelligent and well intentioned person.

[Box, p 8]

Tendency

[Miketa] How do you explain the large numbers of new SPS members?

[Percevic] There is the tendency for many young people to join the SPS. In all the meetings around Serbia at which I have recently participated, I have had the opportunity to convince myself that new members will be coming, and primarily young people. The changes carried out in the SPS Main Committee certainly support this process. I think that young people who join the SPS feel that they can do something in our party; they can see that our state and economy are functioning more successfully and that we are all living better.

Kosovo

DSK's Rugova Praises Overseas Demonstrations

LD3103160895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1232 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 31 Mar (TANJUG)—Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], today praised the recent demonstrations by his compatriots in western European cities and in the United States, thus confirming that the main organizers of these rallies are branches of his party.

Speaking at a news conference, Rugova confirmed that the main demand of the demonstrators was the recognition of the "self-proclaimed republic of Kosovo," and that the demonstrators protested against the alleged violation of the Albaninians' rights. The DSK leader said that the demonstrations by Albanians abroad had an effect on the Albanians in Kosovo, without explaining this statement any further.

When asked about the possibility of organizing similar demonstrations in Kosovo, Rugova replied that "it would be dangerous and risky," and would "result in the escalation of the conflict." In his opinion, however, "this does not indicate the weakness of the Albanians but, rather, confirmation that his group the DSK is keeping the situation in Kosovo under control, because the Albanians are "institutionally organized in almost all spheres."

Asked to comment on Mihajlo Markovic's statement on the need for political dialogue between Serbs and Albanians regarding territorial autonomy, Rugova replied that "everyone has the right to his own stand and opinion." He added, however, that what he does not like about academician Mihajlovic's statement is his "negative attitude to Albanian territory and to Albanian demands for a national identity and the right to their own state."

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